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In our shrinking world, it is important for U.S. planning professionals to understand the difficulties their
counterparts face in other countries. European planning issues may resemble those in the U.S., but the
variety of political, social and economic systems there make the approaches very different from one another
and from ours. Third World planning issues include population control and providing food and shelter,
which may seem far removed from issues we consider to be planning-related. But the problems of over-
crowding, hunger and homelessness affect our personal and professional lives.
This issue of Carolina Planning examines the profession in a variety of international contexts and from
a variety of perspectives. The problems planners face in other parts of the world, and the approaches they
have taken, provide insights into the way we practice planning in the United States.
The interview with Viennese Professor Walter Stohr and the first feature article by Dale Whittington
and Craig Calhoun are applications-oriented, involving fieldwork. Stohr discusses the collection and anal-
ysis of European local development initiatives — an alternative approach to economic development, which
utilizes local resources to build strong economies. Dale Whittington and Craig Calhoun share their experi-
ence trying to establish a microcomputer-based development project directory for donor coordination in
Sudan.
The next two articles evaluate planning problems, albeit in very different contexts. Simon Powell examines
the related problems of planning for industrial development on the urban fringe of Nanjing, China, and
of ensuring agricultural self-sufficiency. Judith Allen describes the Greater London Council's (GLC) chal-
lenge to Britain's "conventional wisdom," which sees planning only as a tool for controlling development.
Allen then analyzes the positive impact of the GLC's approach on London's disempowered groups.
Linda Lacey takes a prescriptive approach by proposing new ways of teaching population studies to plan-
ners. She illustrates in Commentary the application of such an approach through the new curriculum at
the Department of City and Regional Planning.
Carolina Planning staff extends a special thanks to the North Carolina chapter of the APA whose efforts
have helped increase the journal's subscribers. Staff also thanks contributors to the John Parker Trust Fund,
advertisers and regular subscribers for their continued support.
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Carolina Planning welcomes comments and suggestions on the articles published and will be
happy to accept new material for future editions from interested persons. Such material should
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Carolina Planning is published biannually by students in the Department of City and Regional
Planning, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, with the assistance of funds from the
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This issue (Volume 14, No. 1) succeeds Volume 13, No. 1. Subsequent issues will be renumbered
1 in the Spring; 2 in the fall. ^
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Planning from the Bottom Up
An Interview with Professor Walter Stohr
Elizabeth Morton
Heidi Walter Powell
Walter Stohr is a professor of regional planning, and Director of the Interdisciplinary Institute for Urban and Regional
Studies, University of Economics (Wirtschaftuniversitat), Vienna, Austria. He is currently undertaking a compilation
and analysis of local economic development initiatives in several regions of Europe, and has recently completed a study
on the impacts of industrial parks in the United States and abroad.
CP: Please describe the "European Perspectives Project"
that you are working on for United Nations University.
STOHR: UN University is located in Tokyo, but it does
research worldwide. The study which was contracted to
me will document experiences from Europe. The goal is
to see how local or regional communities have successfully
restructured internally, and primarily out of their own
initiative and resources, to cope with the changing inter-
national division of labor. A team of twelve case-study
authors is examining what experiences have been made
in several major regions of Europe as a result of this
restructuring. We are conducting research in rural areas,
which is the most common area type in the analysis,
and old industrial areas, where declining industries have
to be restructured — these are the two major problem
areas. We also look at small- and intermediate-sized cities
and at some restructuring cases of large metropolitan
areas which have very specific problems and different
potentials.
CP: Could you give some examples of the types of de-
velopment activities you have found?
STOHR: We're looking at the actors within individual
communities who have initiated this change process. We're
considering the type of actor and how he or she has related
to local institutional, political or social structures in bring-
ing about such a change. The precondition has always
been an actor, but actors vary from clergy to an entrepre-
neur who became more than just a private entrepreneur,
but a social entrepreneur — he tried to stimulate activities
in addition to his own enterprise. Very often the actor
would be a local authority. For the most part, successful
local authorities were in countries with dynamic local
governments which had recently introduced increasing
autonomy for political and economic development at the
local level.
CP: You've stressed the importance of internal develop-
ment, and have described two types of external inputs
which tend to increase dependency: central government
and large multiregional or multinational enterprises. Is
one of these the "lesser of two evils"? Do depressed regions
have more room for innovation and flexibility under one
set of external conditions?
STOHR: One cannot generalize by saying that one is
better or worse than the other. In the centrally planned
countries, two of which are included in this study (Hun-
gary and Poland), the central government is always the
major initiator of development at the local level, but the
government has brought about a dependency of local
communities which has to a great extent stifled their
ability to act out of their own initiative. This also very
often happens with multinational companies. Multina-
tional companies — the typical case is a company town —
will become such a dominating factor in a local com-
munity that no other initiatives can emerge successfully.
In both cases, local communities can avoid this depen-
dence. Some of the Eastern European case studies show
that there are ways to avoid this complete dependence on
central government. These studies have identified niches
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will be tolerated and which can mobilize human and other
resources for local development successfully. The same can
be applied to large company towns. There are ways in
which a local community can try to benefit from the multi-
national company without becoming completely depen-
dent on it by using it as a catalyst for introducing new
technologies which local firms can take advantage of. So
the question here very often is: How can we promote the
involvement of local firms in servicing or initially con-
tracting or subcontracting with MNCs, rather than leaving
these companies to get all their inputs from outside the
region.
CP: How is the "community interest" usually represented
in negotiations as areas try to attract new high-tech and
industrial development? Specifically, do you feel the com-
munity as a whole has been served by the presence of
Research Triangle Park?
STOHR: Most often, local or regional authorities will
negotiate with external firms — that is the normal pattern.
The negotiator may also be a separate company set up
for development. In Research Triangle Park, Triangle J
Council of Governments substitutes for or represents local
government in negotiations. My impression of Research
Triangle Park is that it was able to attract large enterprises,
both public and private. This is important for creating
a new image and for starting high-technology activities
in North Carolina, since the state has traditionally had
a different image and different dominant sectors. The
question is: How broad has this effect become and how
broad will it become? Research Triangle Park seems to be
comprised of a large number of enterprises that close
themselves off from the outside; they try not to interrelate
with other enterprises, while benefitting from local re-
sources like university knowledge. Once they get this
knowledge, however, they want to monopolize it, refusing
to share with neighboring enterprises. This is one of the
dangers of attracting large corporations. It might be pos-
sible to establish a number of facilities within Research
Triange Park to establish which would be able to house
small- and medium-sized enterprises, sort-of on an incu-
bator basis, to establish relations and offer services to the
large enterprises. The small- and medium-sized enterprises
would thereby become beneficiaries of some of the in-
novations that the large enterprises are developing in
Research Triangle Park. The incubator could be within
the park, adjacent to, or outside the park. This would pro-
vide a type of spillover or multiplier which would cer-
tainly broaden the impact of such a research technology
park.
CP: Have local development endeavors been successful
in utilizing locally available resources, rather than attempt-
ing to create or attract high-tech industries?
STOHR: Many of the case studies that we have analyzed
in the European context show that the panacea of intro-
ducing high-technology industries is often not considered
by local communities as the most important aspect. The
most important aspect is to transform existing sectors,
retraining their traditional strengths, but adapting them
to modern requirements and to existing world market con-
ditions. Localities must transform and modernize existing
enterprises and find new forms of cooperation among
Stohr proposes an incubator function for RTP
Spring 1988, Vol. 14, No. 1
existing enterprises which would permit them to become
competitive without being closed down and replaced by
high-technology firms. There are a number of success
stories even in sectors considered as declining in industri-
alized countries. The Italian textile industry, for example,
has had a marvelous success story. After initial closures,
the Italians modernized small and decentralized plants
which today are completely competitive because they've
changed their technology and they've changed their prod-
uct mix. They are now making very good money. They've
become profitable despite strong competition from East
Asian firms in textiles and similar sectors. They've been
able to carve out functions which the low-wage countries
cannot fulfill.
CP: What do you think of industrial recruitment as an
economic development strategy and how prevalent is it?
STOHR: Industrial recruitment has been the dominant
strategy of local communities that try to outbid other com-
munities to attract outside firms. Usually the only criteria
which communities specified were that firms be large,
powerful and willing to create a large number of jobs in
the area. The types of jobs that would be created, and
the types of entrepreneurial functions that would be
transferred to the area were usually overlooked. These
have turned out to be key elements. If a firm offers only
routine jobs without providing any key entrepreneurial
functions, it may have a negative effect on the community.
The firm may draw labor from other sectors — agriculture
or services— because it may pay slightly higher wages. But
it does not create any developmental potential. It is very
important for local communities to make arrangements
with such enterprises to locate key entrepreneurial func-
tions like research and development or marketing or
headquarter functions. These are certainly the essential
functions that, if attracted to the area, bring much greater
benefits because they are creating quality jobs and the
determination of company policy is much more accessible
to local employees. If a firm performs only routine func-
tions, the local community merely implements what was
decided somewhere else. One therefore, by definition be-
comes more dependent on outside decisionmakers. It is
important for local communities to become aware of these
key issues so that they can advocate for their interests in
negotiations with outside firms. In defining their interests,
communities should not look only at the number of jobs
or magnitude of capital invested, but at the types of jobs
and types of investment that will be made. Such
qualitative issues have very often been overlooked.
CP: What are some advantages and disadvantages of
using qualitative development indicators?
STOHR: Qualitative measures are not substitutes for
quantitative measures. They should be used together, and
one can quantify many of the qualitative criteria. One
would try to quantify qualitative criteria in order to make
a more objective evaluation. In the past, however, re-
searchers have excluded qualitative characteristics because
they could not be evaluated with sufficiently rigid quan-
titative tests. If a characteristic is important, it is sensible
to forgo the "rigid criterion" and include something which
may be methodologically less demanding but which
would still serve an important function in evaluating such
a project.
CP: How might one measure qualitative characteristics
over time? If one were interested in examining changes
in culture, for example, how would one test or prove such
an hypothesis?
STOHR: Culture might be a "soft" area in this respect;
however, even within the economics field you have a
number of qualitative criteria which have not been taken
into consideration in the past. For example, an area ex-
periencing a decline of independent firms and an increas-
ing number of branch plants needs to be considered. Such
factors indicate that the autonomy of the regional econ-
omy is gradually being debilitated. Similarly, if one looks
at the qualification strata of the workforce, one sees that
there are large increases in employment, but they all
happen in only one stratum — maybe the least qualified
or the most qualified only, which happens very often in
high-technology zones such as Silicon Valley. Once alerted
to this phenomenon, one would ask the question: "What
happens if the labor market begins demanding the inter-
mediate qualifications?" One would then try to develop
activities which would give employment to a less bifur-
cated labor market than that which often results from a
high-technology industry. Another qualitative character-
istic is how much research and development money firms
in the region are spending. If one calculates the rate of
total R&D expenditures compared to total expenditures
of these enterprises, one gets a qualitative characteristic
measured in quantitative terms.
CP: Have you found a greater degree of similarity among
types of areas you've defined, such as "rural" or "old in-
dustrial," or within individual countries? What sorts of
similarities and differences have you found among local
development initiatives?
STOHR: There are more similar characteristics among
areas of similar type. Rural local development initiatives
will probably resemble one another more closely than
they will initiatives in old industrial areas in their own
countries. The experiences in old or declining industrial
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areas between European countries will be more similar
with those of other areas. There are certain nationally
determined restrictions and advantages. National policy,
for instance, or national constitutional conditions, will
restrict or promote possibilities existing in all types of
areas. A highly centralized political and administrative
structure will probably have a negative impact on the
development of all types of local initiatives. In a decen-
tralized federal country on the other hand, all areas would
benefit from the increased autonomy of local and regional
authorities, irrespective of area type.
CP: Might you not have other problems under such a
decentralized system; for example, the emergence of com-
pany towns which you spoke of earlier?
STOHR: I think company towns would cut across coun-
tries. Company towns would normally emerge in sparsely
settled areas with no other economic activities besides
agriculture and maybe some local support services. These
would generally be rural, peripheral areas. Sweden, for
instance, has such communities in its northernmost terri-
tories where iron mining dominates the economy. No
other economic activity of any magnitude exists there.
CP: What common development problems do such pe-
ripheral areas face? Have you found any particularly inno-
vative local development initiatives in peripheral areas?
STOHR: If one defines peripheral areas as those without
easy access to major population centers or economic
activities, this means that they are marginal to existing
markets, and in this respect are handicapped. On the other
hand, with regard to local initiatives, it has been observed
that this distance provides them with greater maneuver-
ability. That is, the central government tends to exert less
control. In Scandinavia, this peripheral location has been
considered an advantage because it has given local com-
munities more of an "action radius" to develop inititatives
on their own. There are, therefore, advantages and dis-
advantages. The art is to use the advantages to specialize
in products which do not need extensive transport net-
works. For instance, particularly in high-technology fields,
air has become the most important medium for transpor-
tation. One can try to develop a strategy which satisfies
both requirements.
Scandinavia presents an interesting example of an at-
tempt to bring computer-based homework into peripheral
areas where one can link up computers fairly easily. This
enables residents to remain in dispersed settlement pat-
terns in peripheral locations.
Another example of an innovative initiative is from
Scotland — the concept of a community cooperative. These
are cooperatives which are geared not only to one sector
Initiatives in Scandinavia's peripheral areas enable residents to remain
in dispersed settlements.
— they are multisectoral. They try to include not only pro-
duction, but service activities and social services. They
are therefore multifunctional and multisectoral.
In Hungary, the rural local cooperatives are established
on a territorial basis. They can employ all types of activ-
ities, not only agricultural, but manufacturing and service
activities. In this respect, they are similar to a multisec-
toral complex, but they have a territorial bond and are
therefore interested in developing that territorial unit with
whatever sector activity seems feasible and promising.
This is quite different from the average cooperative, which
is usually only an agricultural, manufacturing or mar-
keting cooperative. These traditional cooperatives are
linked primarily to international markets; their major
allegiances are with such markets rather than with the
local community or territorial unit. A similar example is
the Basque Mondragon cooperative. Here, a territorial
identity is also the basis for the cooperative federation,
a whole system of cooperatives. The goal is to develop
broad packages of activities within the community rather
than to specialize in fields which are only world market-
oriented but have few local linkages and narrow multi-
pliers.
CP: What are the current attitudes internationally, re-
garding the promotion of these kinds of development
activities?
STOHR: In many European countries, and also in the
United States, it has been considered proper to separate
governmental activities from private enterprise activities
— and for understandable reasons. However, the develop-
ment of new technologies— the microelectronic-oriented
technologies— and the example of Japan have triggered
a change in this attitude. The Japanese have been sue-
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cessful in the semiconductor industry because the govern-
ment, in this case the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry, is integrated with private industry. Together they
developed a common strategy of sectoral development,
particularly in the computer industry, which has given
Japanese industry tremendous advantages over U.S. indus-
try. An imitation of the Japanese model currently under
negotiation in the U.S. is Sematech, which is the first joint
venture between the U.S. government and private enter-
prise. In this project, the federal government would team
up with about a dozen computer firms to create a joint
computer development center.
CP: What can and should be the role of national govern-
ments in stimulating the type of internal development you
advocate?
STOHR: In a departure from past practices, governments
would not try to create jobs directly in rural or old indus-
trial areas, or only attract capital to these areas through
capital incentives. This policy has proven to be very
short-sighted because it assumes that capital and jobs are
homogenous factors — neither is. It is much more impor-
tant for central government to improve access to com-
munications to rural or old industrial areas about new
technologies, both regarding world market conditions and
potential niches of unmet demand which might be local-
ly filled, and also about organizational management
practices. The government should be more involved in
facilitating information access than trying to intervene by
giving capital or employment incentives in an unqualified
way. Another important step would be to promote the
formation of innovative structures. In Japan, the central
government has promoted the establishment of local
private-public-university partnerships, tripartite partner-
ships, as the basis of local innovation and development.
If such local partnerships are provided, the government
is willing to co-finance an applied research center, for
instance, for local industry, particularly for local small-
and medium-sized enterprises.
CP: What approach can areas lacking the resources to
develop a tripartite partnership take to stimulate develop-
ment?
STOHR: The Basque cooperative, Mondragon, has been
very successful in linking up with foreign universities in
the U.S. and in France, from which it draws basic research
data. The cooperative then transforms the technologies
in its center for applied technological innovation, for use
within members' own regional contexts. Distance from a
university can often be bridged quite successfully by
transferring information which, if well-organized, can be
sufficient for a brief period. In the long-run, such an area
would certainly need to develop its own local university
or research and training functions under a university-like
label. But if this is not possible initially, there are
substitutes, as the case studies have shown.
CP: What are the prospects for high-tech development?
Do you see any new innovations or trends either in the
technology itself, or the spatial patterns that emerge as
a result?
STOHR: Microelectronics development is extremely im-
portant, but there are new developments such as biotech-
nologies and new materials which are also very important.
The Japanese have identified five areas of innovation
which they promote. One is microelectronics; a second
is computers; a third is new materials, such as ceramics;
a fourth is biotechnology; and finally telecommunications.
Microelectronics is a key innovative element, both tech-
nologically and spatially. It permits the efficient operation
of small machines and small firms, which are flexible
enough to produce for differentiated demand. Small- and
medium-sized enterprises can then be very competitive in
a decentralized pattern. Such "flexible automation" is
spatially important because it can be established outside
of the large agglomerations, where small- and medium-
sized firms dominate.
Elizabeth Morton and Heidi Walter Powell are master's candidates in
the Department of City and Regional Planning at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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Reflections on Donor Coordination: An Attempt to
Establish a Microcomputer-based Development
Project Directory in Sudan
Dale Whittington
Craig Calhoun
The World Bank and USAID have encouraged the coordination of Third World donor organizations as a worthwhile
and feasible endeavor. However, the authors' experience in Sudan illustrates that, despite the availability of microcom-
puters and the tacit agreement of the donor organizations themselves, donor coordination is not easily obtained.
In the summer of 1987, the government of Sudan ex-
pelled several private voluntary aid organizations from
the country and prohibited them from future operations
in Sudan. The international press reported this event as
another inexplicable example of erratic behavior by an
African government. In fact, these and other aid organiza-
tions had been operating in Sudan as if there were no
sovereign government in the country. Representatives of
these donors were flying in and out of Khartoum, the
country's capital, without the slightest pretense of co-
ordinating their activities with the Sudanese government
or other aid organizations. The recent action of the gov-
ernment of Sudan was an understandable attempt to
obtain at ieast some minimal knowledge of and control
over donor activities.
Ironically, the World Bank recently cited Sudan as a
country which has made significant progress in improving
donor coordination (IBRD, 1984, p. 42). Our own work
in Sudan suggests, however, that the problem of donor
coordination is indeed serious and is likely to prove much
more intractable than is commonly realized. In the sum-
mer of 1984, we initiated a project in Sudan funded by
the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) to work with the Sudanese Ministry of Finance
and Economic Planning (MOFEP). The purpose of the
project was to establish microcomputer-based decision
support and management information systems. One of
several components of our effort was to create a com-
puterized data base of all ongoing, planned and completed
development projects in Sudan which would assist the
MOFEP, and the donors with the planning and manage-
ment of development assistance.
The Ministry and USAID conceived of this project as
a preliminary step to promote donor coordination; it was
to provide a fast, easy way for a donor to find out what
other donors had done or were doing in a particular sec-
tor or region. This article describes the failure of the
donors to provide the information required for this proj-
ect data base to function effectively. We offer several
explanations of the donors' failure to cooperate with the
MOFEP and discuss the implications of this experience
for future attempts at donor coordination.
Background
There has for some time been a growing awareness
among both bilateral and multilateral donors that lack
of donor coordination is a major problem. It is at least
partly responsible for the failure of African economies to
effectively utilize their development assistance. In its
report Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan
Africa, the World Bank paints a comprehensive, sobering
picture of the region's economic problems, and outlines
a series of policy measures necessary for its economic
rehabilitation. Two of the report's central recommenda-
tions pertain to the need for improved national economic
management and donor aid coordination. The report calls
for more strategic and flexible public sector planning by
national governments. In addition, it calls for explicit
commitments from both donors and recipient govern-
ments to implement their responsibilities under an agreed
economic recovery program. Specifically, the World Bank
calls for (1) strengthening management information sys-
tems in planning and finance ministries in order to facil-
itate timely policy analysis and strategic planning, and
(2) providing high-quality technical assistance to those
governments interested in building up such capacity
(IBRD, 1984, p. 39).
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AFRICA
The World Bank report pays particular attention to the
need for improved donor coordination.
Aid administration is a particularly important area for
institutional reform. Basic information on aid flows
is often lacking; responsibility for donor contact and
negotiation is unclear; links seldom exist between the
plan, the budget, sector ministries, project entities,
and donor activities. . . .The weaknesses of uncoordi-
nated aid are increasingly recognized by African gov-
ernments and donors. More consultative groups,
UNDP-sponsored roundtables, and other arrangements
have been set up to coordinate aid. . . . However, con-
sultative groups have generally suffered from two
major weaknesses. First, the commitments made by
both governments and donors on program content and
financial support have not been firm enough. Second,
the groups have failed to get more involved in detail —
priorities and assistance for particular sectors, pro-
grams, and projects, or specific changes in pricing and
other incentive policies (IBRD, 1984, pp. 39-43).
Such increased involvement by donors in the details of
aid administration is dependent upon improved access to
information on both government and donor development
activities. Our project was an attempt to work toward
improvements in these areas in Sudan.
The World Bank's call for improved donor coordina-
tion and public sector planning certainly preceded the
publication of this report, and Sudan was one of the first
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to initiate serious efforts
along these lines. At the sixth Consultative Group Meeting
for Sudan held in Paris in January 1983, several donors,
including the United States and the European Economic
Community (EEC), called for the formation of subgroups
of donors and government representatives, organized by
sector, which would meet in Khartoum and monitor the
implementation of Sudan's economic recovery program.
The idea for these sector subgroups developed from the
World Bank's country implementation review process, in
which Bank and government representatives meet to
review progress on Bank investment programs. At the
January 1983 Consulative Group meeting, the chief World
Bank representative and chariman of the Consultative
Group reaffirmed the Bank's support for such monitor-
ing activities and welcomed the inclusion of other donors
in such discussions.
The discussions held during this Consultative Group
meeting led to the establishment of the Joint Monitoring
Committee (JMC) in 1983. The JMC was chaired by the
Minister of Finance and Economic Planning and included
the resident representatives of the World Bank, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and concerned donors. Its primary
purpose was to provide a local forum for more detailed
discussions of how donor assistance could be better co-
ordinated with Sudan's economic policies and investment
program. It was originally envisioned that the JMC would
meet quarterly in Khartoum, and the JMC Secretariat,
consisting of staff from the planning wing of the MOFEP,
would prepare progress reports and analyses for the
quarterly meetings and for the annual Consultative Group
meeting.
The JMC met three times in 1983 and by the seventh
Consultative Group Meeting in December 1983, it was
clear to the donors that additional technical staff needed
to be assigned to the JMC Secretariat if the work of the
JMC was to be productive. Getting donors and govern-
ment representatives together was beneficial, but they
needed information and analysis on the problems they
were to discuss. Still, members of the seventh Consultative
Group Meeting were enthusiastic about the potential con-
tribution of the JMC. The chairman's report notes that
there was a consensus that the JMC was performing a
useful function and that donors should support it in the
coming year. The representative of the Netherlands said
that the JMC was a good start toward donor coordina-
tion in Sudan and that it might have applicability in other
African countries. The EEC representative supported the
work of the JMC and hoped that the coordination that
had been started would be intensified and extended.
Finally, the Sudanese Minister of Finance and Economic
Planning at the time promised a strengthening of the JMC
and noted that the local donor representatives would need
timely information on commitments and disbursements
from their central offices in order to support its work.
The seventh Consultative Group also assigned the JMC
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several matters to examine, the most important of which
was aid disbursement. The Minister of MOFEP suggested
that a comprehensive review of donor disbursement pro-
cedures needed to be conducted in order to understand
the reasons for the slowdown in disbursement of com-
modity aid. The representatives of the Arab Fund and the
African Development Bank expressed the view that the
issue of undisbursed project assistance should be ex-
amined to see if ways could be found to increase the flow
of previously committed money, and also recommended
that this task be given to the Joint Monitoring Committee.
Thus, in December 1983, there was ostensibly strong
support for improved donor coordination in Sudan and
for the work of the JMC, when quite independently we
proposed to the USAID Khartoum mission director that
a microcomputer data base of development projects in
Sudan be established. Our initial idea was to create a data
base using commercially available software (dBase III);
each record in the data base would contain various kinds
of information on a specific development project. Users
could easily search the project data bases for projects of
a certain type (e.g., all agricultural and irrigation projects
in a particular region, or all energy projects funded by
Western European donors which are behind schedule).
As originally envisioned, this computerized project
directory was to serve two primary objectives. First, a cen-
tralized, easily accessible project data base would provide
an overview of donor-financed development activities,
and promote the dissemination of information on proj-
ects among donors. The MOFEP staff could prepare
reports in response to specific requests from donors or
government agencies for project information. Although
conceptually simple, the importance of this objective of
information storage and dissemination should not be
underestimated. The institutional memory of donor or-
ganizations in countries such as Sudan is quite short due
to brief staff assignments, so there is an urgent need for
basic data on project activities. Paper records are poorly
maintained, and project reports are not widely circulated.
The second objective, and ultimately the more impor-
tant one, was to begin to establish a project data base
which would support an improved planning and budget-
ing system within the MOFEP. An up-to-date, centralized
project data base is essential for (1) the preparation of
the development budget, (2) sectoral planning, (3) the
estimation of recurrent costs, and (4) project monitoring
and evaluation. One major goal was to provide the Min-
istry with an early warning system for implementation
and financial problems on development projects.
The need for a centralized set of data on development
projects was widely recognized within the MOFEP and
the donor community. The April, 1984 World Bank
report, Sudan: Planning and Budgeting for Recovery, by
R. Ridker, called for the establishment of a centralized
project directory, and actually proposed two project data
forms for use in system design and data collection. The
MOFEP itself had made several attempts to collect proj-
ect data, and various forms were available in the Minis-
try. For example, when we began our project in the
summer of 1984, we were shown a collection of hand-
written index cards which contained limited project infor-
mation. In addition, the UNDP Advisors to the MOFEP
had drafted forms to be used to collect information on
project activities.
This discussion demonstrates that, although the com-
puterization of a project directory may have been some-
what original in Khartoum, the need for a central file of
information on development projects was widely recog-
nized, both by the MOFEP and the donor community.
In our opinion, however, the actual physical processing
and management of the records for approximately 250 on-
going, donor-financed development projects and 750 loans
and grants proved a major impediment to both simple
data analysis and improved planning and budgeting pro-
cedures. A computer data base was the most practical way
to efficiently manage this much information in a timely
manner. In the summer of 1984, we arrived in Khartoum
to attempt to create such a data base.
Data Collection Efforts
The development of the software for the project direc-
tory was quite straightforward. By far the most difficult
part of establishing the project directory was the collec-
tion of the data to put into the system. There were three
primary places where project data could be located: donor
offices, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
Omdurman Market, Sudan.
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itself and the implementing agencies. This section describes
the efforts to collect data from the donor community.
At the July 1984 meeting of the Joint Monitoring Com-
mittee, the Undersecretary of Planning formally an-
nounced that USAID had agreed to fund our project to
establish a microcomputer-based development project
data base. He requested the donors' assistance in this
work, reminding them of discussions along these lines at
the December 1983 Consultative Group Meeting. In Au-
gust 1984, together with staff from the Secretariat of the
JMC, we personally visited the representatives of the
major bilateral and international donors in Khartoum to
explain the nature of the proposed project directory and
to elicit their help in completing two data forms which
had been designed to collect information on donor-
financed development projects. We paid personal visits
to the Khartoum representatives of the following donors:
UNDP, World Bank, EEC, France, United Kingdom, Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Switzerland and USAID. These visits were followed up
by a formal written request to twenty-two donors from
the Undersecretary of Planning in August 1984, in which
he requested their assistance in completing these two
forms. In addition to the eleven donors noted above, this
letter was sent to the Embassy of Denmark, African
Development Bank, OPEC Fund for International Devel-
opment, Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development,
Islamic Development Bank, Abu Dhabi Fund for Eco-
nomic and Social Development, Abu Dhabi Government,
Saudi Fund for Development, Arab Fund for Economic
and Social Development, UNCDF and International Fund
for Agricultural Development.
To the best of our knowledge, the Undersecretary never
received a reply to his letter from the World Bank, UNDP,
EEC, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Netherlands,
Switzerland, Kuwait Fund for Economic Development, or
the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development.
Contrary to the expectations of the Western donors, by
far the most complete, thorough and prompt responses
were received from the Arab donors. Most of the major
Western donors never even bothered to answer the Under-
secretary's letter; even among the respondents, several
replied in a superficial and incomplete manner.
In November 1984 and in January 1985, we again
visited the Khartoum offices of many of these donors to
request their cooperation in this effort. The Undersecre-
tary of Planning also sent a follow-up letter in January
1985, noting the importance of this work for the JMC.
By the summer of 1985, the Undersecretary had received
only two replies to his second request for project profiles
from the donors: a letter from the Federal Republic of Ger-
many informing the undersecretary that they did not have
time to fill out the forms, and two project data forms from
the Swiss Embassy.
What we find extraordinary about this experience is
that the majority of the donors did not even feel obliged
to answer the Undersecretary's letters, a seemingly simple
courtesy. Perhaps the experience with the World Bank best
illustrates the lack of donor cooperation in this effort. As
noted, this effort was directly responsive to World Bank
policy objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa. The World
Bank's own mission to Sudan in March 1984 called for
the establishment of a computerized data base in Sudan.
World Bank staff in both Khartoum and Washington were
contacted personally on several occasions to make specific
suggestions for changes in the project directory. These
were incorporated into the system design. World Bank
staff continually promised to cooperate with the MOFEP
and USAID to support this effort. Yet the World Bank
did not complete the data forms nor did it answer the
letters from the Undersecretary.
Reasons for the Donors' Failure to Cooperate
In their recent book, Does Aid Work? (1986), Robert
Cassen and his associates note three main reasons for
donors' reluctance to undertake meaningful aid coordina-
tion efforts:
a. Coordination is likely to impair the freedom with
which donors can pursue their political and commer-
cial interests through their aid programs.
b. Donors know that there are both ideological and tech-
nical subjects on which they are likely to disagree, and
aid coordination would create conflicts.
c. Aid coordination can be costly in administrative time
and money.
Although these explanations certainly have merit, based
on our experience in Sudan the problem of donor coor-
dination seems likely to be more invidious than these
reasons suggest. We found both related and additional
explanations for the failure of the donors to cooperate
with the MOFEP and USAID to establish a central deposi-
tory of information on projects. We have categorized them
into three groups: (1) reasons internal to the donor bureau-
cracy, (2) donors' impressions of the external planning
environment, and (3) donors' impressions of the micro-
computer technology itself. Each of these explanations
was informally proffered to us by donor representatives
themselves in follow-up interviews we conducted in the
summer of 1985.
First, even if donors' intentions are good, there is a
variety of organizational pressures which mitigate against
real cooperation. Donor bureaucracies are not structured
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to promote aid coordination. There are few bureaucratic
incentives to individuals within donor bureaucracies to
work with other donors. As the World Bank has noted,
donor coordination is administratively demanding and
time consuming and it is rarely rewarded in terms of pro-
fessional evaluation or promotion (1984, p. 43). Both ex-
ecutives and junior staff are evaluated by central offices
which have little awareness of efforts by their field staff
to work with other donors. In fact, central office personnel
evaluation procedures often foster competition between
donors. An enterprising program officer who lets others
know some of his "best" project ideas may well find them
funded by other donors. On the other hand, many donors
make most of their major programming decisions at the
central headquarters so that individuals in the field typi-
cally feel there is little they can do to promote donor coor-
dination, even if they wanted to. Finally, the donors' field
offices are typically understaffed relative to central head-
quarters, and the individuals from whom we requested
assistance were often extremely busy.
The second set of explanations concerns the donors'
perceptions of their external planning environment. Given
the pressures on their time, donor representatives were
forced to make a judgment as to the likelihood of success
of our effort to establish a computerized project data base,
and the effectiveness of such a system if it were estab-
lished. Too often, the subjective probability assigned to
both of these events was low. The likelihood that we
would succeed in creating the system in the first place was
perceived to be low, in part because each donor felt the
other donors would not cooperate. Therefore, individual
donors saw little reason to participate in the data col-
lection effort themselves. The Western bilateral donors,
in particular, felt that the Arab donors would not coop-
erate. This is a classic "free rider" problem which we had
hoped to address by reaching a collective agreement in
the JMC to support this effort. In the end, however, the
JMC failed to meet regularly. Moreover, little informal
pressure could ,be exerted on donors who did not par-
ticipate.
The donors also had little regard for the efficacy of the
planning wing of the Ministry. To many donor represen-
tatives, the planning wing was so ineffective as to be
irrelevant to their objectives. Their primary interest in the
Planning Ministry had become finding the easiest, fastest
means of getting their projects approved and their funds
disbursed. An effective planning operation in the MOFEP
would inevitably entail less discretion on the part of the
donors in programming their aid and, in the short run
at least, this was perceived to be an obstacle to their aid
program rather than a necessary step in institutional
development. It was thus not clear to donors that the
The capital city of Sudan, Khartoum.
MOFEP wanted the effort to succeed. As one representa-
tive of a private voluntary organization put it,
I don't really think you will be able to establish this
microcomputer data base, but what happens if you do?
I see more problems for me than advantages. Why
should I want to give the Planning Ministry the in-
formation to meddle in our affairs?
Another related reason for the donors' failure to coop-
erate which pertained to their impression of the external
planning environment was that the project was perceived
to be too closely tied to USAID. For the planning wing
of the MOFEP to have a centralized data base of develop-
ment projects was bad enough; for USAID to be the only
donor with such centralized information was even worse.
At the July 1984 JMC meeting, this project was announced
to the donors. Both USAID and MOFEP representatives
assured the other donors that the data in the project
directory would be available to all. However, the donors'
skepticism is understandable in an environment where
data is scarce and is typically treated as proprietary. There
was a fear that the planning wing of MOFEP, and in-
directly USAID, would have much greater access to the
project data base. For at least one donor representative,
there was also an underlying apprehension about creating
the institutional capability in what was then a military
dictatorship to create and manage centralized data bases.
(This concern was not entirely unwarranted. Within a
matter of just a few weeks after the creation of the new
Management Information System Unit in the MOFEP, one
of the USAID-supplied computers was commandeered by
the security police whose stated objective was to set up
a data base of automobile license plates in Khartoum).
A third set of reasons for the donors' lack of coopera-
tion relates to their impressions of the technology itself.
Individuals working for donor agencies in a place like
Sudan can hardly be expected to be up-to-date in the latest
developments in microcomputer technology, and, indeed,
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they were not. For this reason, they were unable to real-
istically evaluate the magnitude of the software develop-
ment which we proposed and the likelihood that it would
succeed. Many had had frustrating experiences with main-
frame computers of some sort and tended to extrapolate
their horror stories to microcomputers. We encountered
a wide range of skeptical comments about computers in
general. At least five individuals independently offered
us that sage advice, "garbage in; garbage out," implying
that the whole effort was futile. The message was really
that computers were an inappropriate technology in such
a data-poor environment; that this was simply another
example of a capital-intensive technology being pushed
by donors without regard to the needs and capabilities
of the local economy. We disagree with this line of reason-
ing, but it certainly deserves serious examination (see
Calhoun, Drummond and Whittington, 1987).
In contrast to hardware issues, several donor represen-
tatives felt that the software development applications we
proposed were far too sophisticated. In reality, the soft-
ware development was the easiest, most tractable and least
time consuming part of our assignment. Maintaining soft-
ware and training people in its use, on the other hand,
is an important issue.
Implications for Future Donor Coordination Efforts
To date, the campaign for donor coordination has been
carried out at a fairly superficial level. It is one more
exercise in what Robertson (1985) has termed the "ritual
of planned development." Many of the donors that rheto-
rically call for coordination simply do not want it. More-
over, many Western donors adopt a patronizing attitude
towards the whole process. Their attitude is also a source
of misunderstanding about their own and others' perfor-
mance. At the center of this patronizing attitude is a belief
in their own bureaucratic efficiency and in the inefficiency
of the host country's bureaucracy.
Although donors such as the World Bank support the
idea of improved donor coordination, their representa-
tives do not really know what this entails in terms of data
management and analysis. Most donor coordination
efforts have not proceeded beyond the level of general
discussions because donors place data management de-
mands upon the ministries of finance and planning which
even the donors themselves do not know how to address.
Few donor representatives have thought seriously about
how they would manage the flow of paperwork associated
with hundreds of millions of dollars of aid from thirty
donor agencies — all with different accounting procedures,
currencies and priorities — with the limited budget avail-
able to a minister of finance or planning in an aid-
dependent economy such as Sudan's.
Ironically, donors' demands for information on the
recipient government's development projects and policies
may be greatest precisely in those cases where the govern-
ment is least able to respond and where the development
plans are least likely to be effective. Such demands can
contribute to the destruction of host country planning
institutions (Morss, 1984). This suggests to us that the field
staff of donor agencies concerned with aid administra-
tion need to spend less time giving advice to ministries
of finance and planning about data management and
planning problems which they themselves have never
faced, and more time actually working with these bureau-
cracies to improve their management information and
decision support systems. In our experience, many of the
staff of the MOFEP want to do a better job managing and
coordinating donor assistance, but it is a complicated task
with which they need help — particularly in the area of
microcomputer applications. Donors tend to berate them,
but offer little in the way of ideas or concrete assistance.
Moreover, donors do not adequately appreciate the nature
of the data management demands they themselves are
placing on the development planning enterprise.
Calls for improved donor coordination are likely to fail
unless underlying organizational and attitudinal issues are
addressed more directly and seriously. Part of the prob-
lem is simply that all donors want to coordinate, but no
one wants to be coordinated. Based on our experiences
in Sudan, we believe future improvements in the area of
donor coordination depend in large part upon more
explicit policy directives from top management in both
multilateral and bilateral donor agencies. Almost without
exception, the donor representatives in Khartoum with
whom we dealt treated donor coordination as a peripheral
concern. Typically, their primary responsibility was to see
that the budget targets for their aid allocations were spent,
not that they were effectively coordinated with national
government priorities and the work of other donors.
Top managers in donor agencies must change the in-
centive structure which their staff faces, in order that time
spent on coordination with other donors is recognized and
rewarded in personnel evaluations and advancement.
Until then, real progress in donor coordination will be
slow. We suggest that management experiment with ways
of obtaining written evaluations of staff job performance
from national government counterparts in the ministries
with which they deal. Management must also realize that
donor coordination efforts are time consuming and re-
quire a long-term commitment to the institutional de-
velopment of both the donor agency and the national
government. If serious attention is given to the issue of
donor coordination, information management support of
the kind we tried to develop will be essential.
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Development on the Urban Fringe:
Recent Chinese Experience
Simon G. Powell
The challenge of developing on the urban fringe takes on new dimensions in the changing economic climate of China.
This article explores the difficulties planners face in trying to balance China's desire for increased industrial growth
on the fringe with the political goal of Chinese cities to maintain a self-sufficient agricultural base.
Introduction
In recent years, Western media reports have emphasized
the dramatic reforms which have been sweeping contem-
porary China, transforming a rigid, bureaucratic socialist
system into a burgeoning market economy True, important
advances have been made in China since 1978 when Deng
Xiaoping consolidated his power-base. But as many foreign
firms, lured to China by the prospect of one billion con-
sumers have discovered to their cost, China is far from
being a market economy.
The reality of economic reform in China is a picture
of uneven and patchy development. The official planning
system— despite some relaxations — still controls the pro-
duction and supply of the most important goods and com-
modities, and in many ways remains as unwieldy now
as it was under the Maoists. It is in this context— a system
in a state of upheaval — that current developments on the
urban fringe must be placed.
Nanjing: the setting
One common location of relative prosperity in the cur-
rent phase of development is on the urban fringe. The
extent and depth of development will vary from city to
city, but belts of significant rural wealth are to be found
on the outskirts of most Chinese cities.
Throughout history Nanjing has been one of China's
most important cities. First settled in 472 B.C., Nanjing
has at various times been China's capital. Situated on a
plain in southwestern Jiangsu province, eastern China,
Nanjing is surrounded by a terrain of low hills and rivers,
most notably the Yangzi.
The urban core is surrounded by suburban city districts
of mixed land use — Dachang, Qixia, Yuhuatai and Pukou.
Beyond the suburban districts are the five dty-administered
rural counties — Jiangpu, Jiangning, Liuhe, Lishui and
Gaochun — with 198,000 hectares (ha) of cultivable land
(see Figure 1). The periphery also contains a diversity of
mineral wealth including deposits of iron, gypsum, lead,
zinc and manganese as well as limestone and sandstone.
Agriculture and rural industry are both well developed.
Figure 1. Nanjing Municipality
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Table 1 illustrates the growth of Nanjing in this century:





City Municipality City Municipality City
1922 0.3 n/a n/a n/a n/a
1931 0.63 n/a n/a n/a n/a
1937 1.01 n/a 840 n/a 1202
1949 1.14 n/a 840 n/a 1357
1960 1.65 n/a 840 n/a 1964
1970 1.58 n/a 840 n/a 1880
1973 1.3 2.4 840 3190 1547
1977 1.7 3.2 840 4500 2023
1979 1.95 n/a 840 n/a n/a
1981 2.08 3.65 867 4718 2399
1982 2.13 3.74 867 4718 2456
1983 2.17 4.56 867 6516 2502
1984 2.2 4.6 867 6516 2537
*Nanjing is the municipality consisting of the urban core and the suburban
districts (city) and the 5 city-administered counties.
**A11 figures deduced.
Compiled from materials in note 1.
The rapid increase in population in the 1920s was a result
of Nanjing becoming China's capital once again. Nanjing
suffered badly during the Japanese occupation but grew
significantly in the 1950s, a period of rural-urban migra-
tion. Population growth was stalled in the late 1960s and
early 1970s (the period of the Cultural Revolution) by a
policy of rustification, in which significant numbers of
city dwellers were forcibly moved to the countryside.
However, by the end of the 1970s, with the return of those
sent down to the countryside during the rustification
movement, the city population continued to grow. Popu-
lation densities within the city also grew steadily.
This growing pressure upon available space and infra-
structure is one of the key problems currently facing
Nanjing planners. There is a clear need to deflect further
growth from an already over-crowded urban core and in
particular to manage future industrial growth. This is an
urban planning problem true for cities throughout the
world. Another key concern is how to feed the expanding
city. This is a rural planning problem, unique to the Third
World and to China in particular, with its goal of urban
self-sufficiency in foodstuffs. This article examines two
problems.
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Industrial Growth and Satellite Towns
The expansion of industrial activity within the city
center has long been a problem for Nanjing planners. In
the 1930s Nanjing had little in the way of an industrial
base, its size and stature reflecting its role as capital city
with all the administrative and bureaucratic organs which
accompany such a position. 2 However, after Liberation
in 1949, industrial growth in Nanjing was rapid:







City Counties City Counties Municipality
1930s n/a n/a n/a n/a 16
1949 881 n/a n/a 10
1952 1302 n/a n/a n/a
1979 n/a n/a n/a n/a 350
1981 1236 876 2.4 0.13 570
1982 1250 974 2.3 0.2 n/a
1983 1261 1572 2.56 0.29 n/a
1984 1351 1524 2.91 0.33 n/a
*1981 Gross Industrial Output Value at 1970 constant prices; 1982ff.
values at 1980 constant prices.
Compiled from materials in note 3.
The first expansion of industry was predominantly within
the urban core. By the late 1950s, expansion of industrial
activity was so extensive that shortages of housing, public
utilities and other support services were becoming increas-
ingly evident. In the 1960s, enterprises began to locate in
the suburban districts to accomodate further industrial
growth. Small townships such as Dachang, Longtan, Ban-
qiao and Xishanqiao developed into significant industrial
zones. However, development was somewhat misman-
aged, with industrial development often conducted at the
expense of the most productive farmland — surrounding
the urban core — a major source of vegetables for urban
consumption.
By the 1970s, industrial space in the urban core was
all but saturated. Further growth, even if physically
possible, would only exacerbate urban overcrowding, pol-
lution and waste disposal problems. Thus, Nanjing plan-
ners continued the established trend of developing the
industrial zone in the suburbs. By this time, the diversity
of industrial concerns in the city center and suburbs was
considerable. Activities included mining, metallurgy, tel-
ecommunications, machine-building, petrochemicals,
trucks, and chemical fibres.
Currently, the suburbs themselves are becoming over-
crowded. Industrial growth is expanding through the
suburbs into the city-administered rural counties. In an
effort to effectively control this expansion, planners have
tried to channel growth into designated satellite towns,
such as the rural townships of Liuzhen, Zhujiang and
Dongshan. The suburban townships of Dachang, Longtan,
Banqiao and Xishanqiao, de facto satellite towns for a
number of years, were included in this group.
The concept of satellite towns was first put forward by
Chinese planners in the early 1950s. Ideally, such towns
would range in size from 50,000 to 200,000 people. While
access to the nearby city was considered important, it was
perceived that satellite towns would be independent urban
entities and the location of a significant number of urban-
based employment opportunities, and adequate urban
facilities.
Satellite towns were intended to relieve the pressures
on China's overcrowded cities. Industrial enterprises real-
ized that expansion was limited by several factors: a lack
of space; increasing traffic congestion; housing shortages,
a situation made worse by the significant in-migration to
Chinese cities in the 1950s; and increasing levels of
pollution — industrial and domestic— exacerbated by
growing overcrowding.
However, the experience of satellite towns in Nanjing
reveals a sharp divergence between planning theory and
practical achievement. First, satellite town development
has failed to match industrial growth with the construc-
tion of adequate urban infrastructure. Living conditions
are poor, while living costs are high. Transportation and
communications links, even to the city center, are weak.
Education and sanitary standards are low.
Furthermore, much-needed capital investment funds are
largely unavailable. While Kirkby reports that since 1982
some improvements in this situation are being made in
the suburban satellite towns, the situation in the rural
Farming for urban consumption.
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satellites remains bleak. 4 Compare, for example, the
figures in Table 3. Although not directly correlated to ser-
vice provision in satellite towns, Table 3 gives a clear
indication of the discrepancy in capital availability and
service provision between the urban and suburban dis-
tricts (City), and the remainder of the municipality
Table 3. Nanjing. Investment. Service Provision.
Various indicators. 1981-1984. ($ percapita)
Rural Rural Rural Rural
City Cos. City Cos. City Cos. City Cos.
Gross investment in
capita] construction by
State-owned units 78.9 4.4 116.1 6.4 90.5 1.7 133.1 2.7
Of which:
1. Non-productive 38.2 1.4 56 2.9 45 1.3 51.7 1.7
construction
2. Culture, education. 13.3 0.4 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
health and research
3. Civil public utilities 7.5 0.2 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Secondary schools:
1. Total number 169 155 170 162 n/a n/a n/a n/a
2. Schools : students 1:769 1:451 1:759 1:451 n/a n/a n/a n/a
3. Teachers : students 1:13 1:18 1:12 1:19 1:12 1:20 1:12 1:21
Primary schools:
1. Total number 456 1225 456 1184 n/a n/a n/a n/a
2. Schools : students 1:394 1:163 1:367 1:152 n/a n/a n/a n/a
3. Teachers : students 1:20 1:24 1:18 1:23 1:19 1:25 1:21 1:25
Hospital beds:
1. Total number 11219 3770 8802 2382 9068 3936 9245 4051
2. Beds : population 1:185 1:416 1:242 1:676 1:239 1:607 1:238 1:592
Some figures deduced.
Compiled from materials in note 5.
Satellite towns also suffer from poor management. All
too often land use planning is weak, resulting in the siting
of incompatible uses (e.g., chemical plants located next
to hospitals and schools). The weakness of planning
measures is also well illustrated by reports both of misuse
and waste of valuable cultivable land around satellite
towns. 6
Currently the illegal use of land for housing constuction
around the rural satellites is of particular concern. In 1984
all but 3.4 percent of residential building space under con-
struction by state and collective units was located in the
city center and suburbs. 7 For the most part, individuals
in the rural satellites are responsible for housing construc-
tion. In many cases this has resulted in housing being built
on land designated for other purposes. Liu Zhongchun
reports that between 1976 and 1981, 1,000 ha of cultivable
land were lost in the municipality to housing construc-
tion as well as brickworks, factories and commercial en-
terprises. 8 However, the official figures for cultivable land
availability in Table 4 do not reflect this— an indication
that the official statistics must be treated with care. (More
accurate information is unavailable, and most likely does
not exist.)
In the suburban satellites, the issue now is not so much
illegal use of land, but an absolute lack of land. The rate
of construction is increasing, with ten-story residential
buildings becoming more common. Population densities
are rising, putting a severe strain on the already over-
burdened infrastructure.
Clearly, in both the suburban and rural satellite towns,
much capital investment in infrastructure is needed. Too
much of what little capital investment does take place
serves only to create further pressure on the already weak
existing infrastructure. This is a difficult situation with
no easy solutions.
Another concern is that the industrial base which has
been developed in the satellite towns, ostensibly providing
the foundation for autonomous urban development, is
weak. A distinction must be drawn here between the in-
dustry of suburban satellites, and that of the more recently-
established rural satellites. The industrial base of the
suburbs appears to be solid. As Table 2 indicates, virtually
all of Nanjing's gross industrial output value is derived
from the urban core and suburbs. While numerically the
rural industrial base is large, it actually consists of small-
scale undertakings using obsolete equipment with inferior
technical levels.
Lack of capital is a distinguishing factor here. Poor
planning is another. Supply of certain key raw materials
is limited, and the planning system remains unable to meet
the increasing demands for these materials from the wide
range of enterprises which require them, leading to frustra-
tion and economic hardship. 9 Zhang Fubao notes that the
industrial base of Zhujiang for example, faces competi-
tion from more efficient, well-established factories for
both markets and raw materials. In the current economic
climate, in which industrial wage levels are linked to pro-
ductivity and performance in the marketplace, there is
little room for sentiment among competing factories. In
this environment, fledgling industrial enterprises in the
rural satellites will continue to find competition intense
and growth difficult.
In Nanjing, the burden of deflecting future growth away
from the urban core lies principally with the rural satellite
towns. The suburban satellite towns have, in many
respects, done as much as possible to reduce pressure on
the urban center. Their future role in this regard is limited.
Given this fact, the relatively severe difficulties currently
experienced by rural satellite towns must be of critical
concern to planners.
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At this time, the rural satellite towns have only a weak
industrial base from which to develop a wide range of
urban-based employment. Their urban infrastructure is
even less developed. Currently their population growth
owes more to peasants moving in from the countryside
than any movement out from the city center. Furthermore,
unless living conditions improve markedly, it is unlikely
that any such movement from the city center would occur
without a great deal of pressure from the authorities.
While these towns may be promoting some localized wealth
in the countryside around them, these benefits do little
to ease the burden of overcrowding in the urban core.
For the moment, improvements remain unlikely. Invest-
ment capital is limited, and much of what is available con-
tinues to be used to shore up longstanding problems
within the urban and suburban districts. It is difficult to
see a way out of this situation. Significant inputs of capital
and strict controls over current growth in the city center,
suburbs, and rural counties are needed. Neither seems to
be forthcoming.
Feeding the City
It has long been a planning goal that Chinese cities
should, as much as possible, be self-sufficient in providing
foodstuffs. To attain this goal, cities have included neigh-
boring rural counties within their municipal boundaries.
Self-sufficiency as a planning goal is politically important
in that it gives a city a significant element of independence
from the state planning system. It is also a reflection of
economic reality because it is important that cities avoid
long distance interprovincial trade and transfers of food-
stuffs. Such movements inevitably involve high transpor-
tation costs, excessive amounts of spoilage and waste, and
place a heavy burden upon an already fragile transporta-
tion and commercial system.
In pursuit of self-sufficiency, Nanjing planners have
established two distinct production zones within the
municipality. The first, cultivable land in the suburban
districts, is a zone of predominantly vegetable production;
the second, the rural counties, is a zone where grain is
the major crop.
The establishment of a periurban vegetable production
zone has numerous advantages. Vegetable producers have
easy access to urban markets for sales to consumers, as
well as to vegetable processing plants. This proximity
minimizes spoilage and wastage losses incurred during
shipment, as well as transport costs. There is also a plenti-
ful water supply and the availability of night soil collected
daily from the urban core. Pig breeding is strongly associ-
ated with vegetable production, and in Nanjing, periurban
pig production is an important part of the city's meat sup-
ply (see Table 4).
Table 4. Nanjing. Agricultural Base. 1981-1984.
1981 1982 1983 1984
Cultivable land (1000 ha):
1. City 22.7 22.7 22.7 n/a
2. Rural Counties 135.3 135.3 198 n/a
Commercial vegetable growing
base: (1000 ha)
1. City 4.7 n/a n/a n/a
2. Rural Counties 0.5 n/a n/a n/a
Output of major agricultural
products: (1000 metric tons)
1. Grain — City 108.8 115.2 110.5 120.5
— Rural Counties 857.8 993.4 1640.5 1737.8
2. Vegetables City 283.4 297.3 261.8 303.8
— Rural Counties 59.7 67.9 206.6 383.9
3. Fruit City n/a n/a 2.4 2.6
- Rural Counties n/a n/a 3.4 4.1
4. Hogs (1000) City 160 172 145 n/a
Rural Counties 460 443 769 n/a
Some figures deduced
Compiled from materials in note 10.
In Nanjing, this zone of vegetable production was for-
mally established in 1959. Production is highly specialized
and intensive, with heavy inputs of both labor and ferti-
lizer. Production is also mechanized to a significant
degree. This zone has produced and continues to produce
substantial quantities of vegetables for the city (see Table
4). The exception to this occurred during the early 1970s
when, like much of China, Nanjing's vegetable base was
cut to allow increased grain production.
Beyond this zone, significant amounts of vegetables are
produced in the rural counties, as Table 4 illustrates. In
the rural counties, however, grain is still the dominant
crop, with vegetable production playing a subsidiary role.
Even for a city the size of Nanjing, with its fertile
agricultural resource base, achieving a goal of self-
sufficiency is not easy. As noted above for instance, there
is still continuing pressure on periurban cultivable land
for use in building projects.
Of greater significance are difficulties in grain produc-
tion. Throughout history, producing sufficient grain to
feed a huge population has been a yardstick by which
regimes in China have been judged. This problem is espe-
cially severe around major cities, areas with large non-
productive populations.
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Despite the reemergence of free markets, foodstuffs in urban areas are
in short supply.
Since the 1978 agricultural reforms, state planners have
attempted to give peasants the incentive to improve agri-
cultural outputs, particularly that of grain, by allowing
them to sell privately or to the state, any produce beyond
allotted production quotas. Peasants have been encouraged
to diversify crop production (again after the fulfillment
of allotted quotas) as well as to develop non-agrarian
undertakings such as local industry, service occupations
and animal husbandry.
These policies have undoubtedly stimulated grain pro-
duction within the municipality. However, pressure re-
mains to increase grain output further. A key variable here
is the official price of grain. Production quotas require
the supply of a stated amount of grain at an official
market price. This price, despite recent increases, is low
relative to other crops, and also to the use-value of grain.
Grain production is thus unpopular with the peasants,
and production beyond personal need and the allotted
grain quota is discouraged.
However, the bare fulfillment of production quotas
alone does not satisfy urban grain demands. Thus, Nanjing
planners are faced with the problem of how to increase
grain output even further. Raising grain output quotas
is not something that would be readily tolerated in the
rural counties. In essence, the extent to which peasants
can prosper is determined by their ability to generate
wealth, through agrarian or other occupations, once allot-
ted grain quotas have been met. Given that current quota
levels represent significant inputs of land, labor and
capital, raising grain quotas would have an immediate im-
pact on peasant income levels, making it more difficult
to engage in anything but grain farming, and severely
limiting their enthusiasm for agricultural production. (An
emphasis upon grain production in the Cultural Revolu-
tion, for instance, was a key explanation for poor agri-
cultural performance during that period.)
The alternatives to higher grain quotas are limited. In
recent years, Nanjing has attempted to bolster its grain
production by incorporating additional rural counties
within the municipality. In 1974 Liuhe county was incor-
porated, followed in 1983, by Lishui and Gaochun coun-
ties. The effect of these latter additions upon agricultural
output was marked (see Table 4); however, this impact
was a one-time addition to production and is not in itself
an answer to Nanjing's future increasing demands for
agricultural produce.
Future sources of extra grain will be sought from in-
creases in the per-unit yields of existing grain fields. There
are two elements to this increase. The first element is the
improvement of yields of farmers who produce the bare
minimum of grain allowed by their quotas. This would
facilitate increases in the quota without necessarily in-
creasing inputs of land, although this will mean increases
in labor and capital inputs. Second, the yields of farmers
who specialize almost exclusively in grain production
must be increased.
To implement the first element, agricultural production
within the Nanjing countryside is demonstrating a grow-
ing sophistication. Liu Daochun et al. report that a grow-
ing number of peasant households are moving away from
agricultural production itself to provide a variety of skilled
agricultural production services to other peasants. 11 In this
way, skills in such diverse areas as seedling cultivation,
seed-strain development, disease and pest control and fer-
tilizer application are becoming available to a wider range
of peasants and it is hoped that per-unit yields will rise
accordingly. However, for this to occur, planners need to
ensure that supplies of chemical fertilizer, pesticides and
other key farming inputs are available so that peasants
can take advantage of the skills being offered to them.
There have been reports that these supplies are both in-
sufficient and irregular. 12
Given what has been said about the poor returns for
grain production, it may be surprising to discover that
any producers are willing to specialize in grain production.
Farmers are required to devote significantly higher inputs
of land, labor and capital to grain production and subse-
quently they supply higher rates of commodity grain to
the state than most producers. The key to this develop-
ment is the amount of subsidy offered to these grain
specialists. These subsidies may involve cheap and guaran-
teed supplies of fertilizer and pesticides, as well as direct
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income subsidies, matching the incomes of grain specialists
to those earned by peasants who diversify beyond grain.
Such subsidies are expensive to the local authorities within
the municipalities who administer them, but are justified
by reports of both high per-unit yields and total output
by the grain specialists. 13 It is unclear, however, if this
initial success can be maintained and developed to satisfy
all of the city's grain demands.
Failure to increase grain output will certainly leave
planners with hard choices about future developments in
Nanjing. Increases in the non-productive population with-
out concomitant increases in grain production will be diffi-
cult to accept. Furthermore, it is already clear that sig-
nificant tensions exist within the rural counties as a result
of the current direction of rural development within the
municipality.
There are tensions, for instance, caused by the relative
concentration of vegetable production, a source of high
producer incomes, in the suburban districts. Table 4 indi-
cates that since the addition of Lishui and Gaochun coun-
ties in 1983, the rural counties have a much bigger share
of the vegetable market, but it is unlikely that this increase
has done more than temporarily ease the tension.
Similarly, tensions are found within the rural counties
as some producers prosper more than others. The further
geographically removed peasants are from urban markets,
the more difficult it becomes to take advantage of the cur-
rent freedoms within the rural production system. Com-
mercial and transport links to the city center from the
periphery, only a distance of perhaps 50 to 60 km, are
extremely weak. This is especially true to the north and
west of the city beyond the Yangzi, and in the extreme
south of the new city-administered counties of Lishui and
Gaochun. Thus, on the periphery, income and employ-
ment opportunities are increasingly limited to the arable.
Commodity production is likewise limited, which restricts
the potential of the peripheral authorities to subsidize
grain specialists, limiting the extent to which other peas-
ants are able to diversify beyond grain and local develop-
ment in general. This situation contrasts sharply with the
prosperity exhibited by the rural communities more proxi-
mate to the city and suburbs.
Finally, as noted above, recent growth in rural satellites
owes more to an influx of peasants from the countryside
than to migration of urban dwellers from the city center
and suburbs. While living conditions in the rural satellites
may not appeal to existing city dwellers, they are attrac-
tive to peasants in the surrounding countryside, seeking
more urban-based employment. Because the work has tra-
ditionally been seen as less rewarding, and certainly much
harder than urban-based employment, it is difficult to
maintain peasant enthusiasm for agricultural production.
Though planners are eager to develop rural satellites to
relieve pressure on the city center and suburbs, the same
development creates further difficulties for those planners
seeking to encourage agricultural production in order to
attain self-sufficiency.
Conclusion
Theoretical prescriptions for the development of the ur-
ban fringe of Nanjing have been quite readily made, but
the reality of the economic environment in which these
prescriptions have been implemented has produced only
partial success. In Nanjing, the suburban satellite towns
did much to relieve early pressure on the city center, but
they tended to be developed without the necessary invest-
ment in urban infrastructure, a deficiency which is only
now being rectified. Given the limited capital available,
planners will find it difficult to effectively develop rural
satellite towns and prevent them from falling into the same
trap.
Furthermore, while the current economic environment
in China has certainly proved successful in generating
growth (albeit perhaps only in the short run), policies of
increasing competitiveness pose problems for planners
and their development goals. Industrial growth in the
rural satellites is subject to fierce competition, hindering
planning objectives for the strength of their industrial
base. The opening up of urban markets to rural producers,
combined with the low price of grain, has resulted in grain
acreage being reduced in favor of more remunerative cash
crops, making self-sufficiency more difficult to achieve.
This changed economic environment has created new
problems and opportunities for planners, and has accen-
tuated long-standing difficulties. The way in which plan-
ners react to this changing environment will largely be
determined by the measure of flexibility they are given
to solve problems and the resources that are made avail-
able to them. It will also depend on how much they
themselves can adapt to planning in a system which if not
governed by the market, certainly needs to respond to
market forces. This represents a real challenge after plan-
ning in a rigid, socialist system. It is unclear from the
material presented for Nanjing if they will have sufficient
resolve or resources.
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Land shortage on the urban fringe encourages peasants to use all available land.
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No Voice, No Choice: Community Group Involvement
in London's Metropolitan Strategic Planning Process
Judith Allen
London's increasingly expensive land market has intensified demands on commerical and residential land both within
and outside the city center. These demands have greatly affected the poor and working class. Recognizing that the
current planning structure does not adequately address the needs of these groups, the Greater London Council in 1981
developed the Community Areas Policy, a metropolitan strategic planning initiative to involve them. The impacts of
its efforts challenged the traditional planning structure, and in 1986 the GLC was dissolved.
Introduction
The struggles during the late nineteenth century for
local democratic governments which would address the
needs of all citizens illustrates one common origin of town
planning in both Britain and America. However, the way
planning has subsequently been institutionalized in both
countries makes it difficult to meet these aspirations. In
practice, planning is characterized by an internal tension
between aspirations for justice and the need for a rational
urban property market demanded by the development in-
dustry. Sometimes these two interests coincide, but the
speculative nature of much urban property development
means that they more often conflict.
Between 1981 and 1986, the last elected administration
at the Greater London Council (GLC) addressed these con-
flicts directly in a radically new approach to metropolitan
strategic planning, as part of a general libertarian political
program aimed at empowering specific groups within
London. The program initially focused on the unem-
ployed, women, and ethnic minorities and was extended
to a wider range of groups during the period of office.
Charismatic leadership, and a budget which made it the
"fourteenth largest nation-state in the world," meant that
the GLC had the resources to pursue these political com-
mitments. It is commonly believed that the GLC's effec-
tiveness in mobilizing these groups threatened the con-
servative central government and was the political source
for national legislation abolishing not only the GLC, but
the six other metropolitan governments in England in
1986.
This article outlines some of the ways in which the
GLC's radical political program changed the practice of
metropolitan strategic planning in London. In particular,
it identifies how these changes in strategic planning pro-
cesses represented a significant challenge to the conven-
tional wisdom in British planning.
The Context: London's Land Market
The speculative land market in London is extremely
buoyant. Office-space rents in central London, for exam-
ple, are higher than in any other city in western Europe.
The buoyancy of the land market is supported by high
levels of direct investment by the central government in
urban regeneration programs which promote and support
speculative commercial development. At the same time,
deregulation of the stock exchange has placed London on
a level with Tokyo and New York in the world financial
market, leading to an explosion of demand for large
(35,000 square foot) trading floors. This need is largely
being met through new development.
London generally has a "traditional" urban structure,
in which poorer working class residential areas surround
the central commercial area. Consequently, the effects of
enhanced commercial land speculation in the center spread
rapidly throughout inner London. The demand for com-
mercial development has also intensified demand for inner
city luxury housing, and the price of residential land here
now exceeds that for commercial uses outside the central
core. Within the British planning system, increased hous-
ing demand is far more difficult to manage than commer-
cial demand, since the system basically controls changes
between land uses, and not within any one use.
The Community Areas Policy
This analysis of the speculative land market in central
London informed the way the GLC's general political pro-
gram was interpreted in metropolitan strategic planning.
The Community Areas Policy, a set of linked initiatives
directly supporting communities threatened by commer-
cial development, formed the centerpiece of the strategy
Fourteen local areas surrounding central London were
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designated as "community areas." Within these areas, a
wide range of groups could apply for capital grants to
develop a variety of social and community facilities.
Directing the money through community groups, rather
than relying on direct public sector investment, was a
major innovation in British planning.
Coupled with revenue support for community workers,
the grants visibly linked the day-to-day concerns of com-
munity groups with wider planning objectives, thereby
supporting the groups' participation in the revision of the
metropolitan strategic plan. Thus, the grants helped coun-
teract the tendency for participation to be dominated by
metropolitan-wide interest groups and middle class
"amenity groups."
Revising the Strategic Plan
The Community Areas Policy was further developed
at the strategic level in the context of revising the Greater
London Development Plan (GLDP), which was seriously
out of date by 1981. A radical view of metropolitan plan-
ning generally informed the revisions, and the very high
priority given to the Community Areas Policy strongly
influenced specific policy changes.
Other innovative policy changes arose from the GLCs
commitment to the development of planning policies rele-
vant to all the groups included within its general political
program. As with the Community Areas Policy, the plan-
ning work was facilitated by grants and broader policy
programs directly supporting these groups. Much of the
participation program associated with the revisions was
organized around these groups, contrasting with tradi-
tional approaches which reflect either specific land uses
or spatial subareas. At the same time, the "spatial visions"
expressed in the revised GLDP grew out of this socially-
based approach.
Thus, the strategic planning process as a whole was
strongly integrated into the GLCs general political program.
Challenging Conventional Wisdom in
Metropolitan Strategic Planning
Conventional wisdom arises out of a set of interlock-
ing factors. By and large, it reflects what is feasible within
a particular administrative structure, set of professional
interests, broader political environment and social struc-
ture. These views then become embedded in the personal
attitudes, values and approaches of members of the polit-
ical system. The processes which institutionalize conven-
tional wisdom become self-reinforcing and obscure the
possibility of developing radically new approaches to meet
wider social objectives.
It is significant, then, that the radical innovations in
metropolitan strategic planning implemented by the last
GLC administration had their roots outside the formal
structure of the GLC and in the planning section of the
1981 London Labour Party manifesto. The process of writ-
ing the manifesto had been highly consultative, and was
based on the London Labour Party's need to build a new
electoral coalition in response to changes in the demo-
graphic composition of London. This coalition was largely
built on addressing the needs of specific, but already
relatively well-organized groups in London— the unem-
ployed, women, and ethnic minorities. "Community
groups" in London pushed their demands within this
broader context, and the manifesto's planning commit-
ments reflect the high level of politicization of "local
planning" issues which had characterized the 1970s. The
manifesto did, however, address for the first time the
strategic dimension of these demands. The manifesto out-
lined the general political program of the last GLC ad-
ministration and provided a broad framework for a radical
approach to metropolitan strategic planning. A new kind
of planning process was developed which emphasized five
strategies focusing on key problems, immediate implemen-
tation, direct implementation, containing commercial
development, and legislative barriers. This new process
challenged the conventional wisdom about metropolitan
strategic planning in ways that were not predicted in 1981.
Key Problems
The last GLC administration saw planning as focused
on solving specific, immediate key problems. This raises
the questions, "whose problems?" and more importantly,
"who must be satisfied with the solutions?" These are
political questions, and the answers were clear within the
general political program of the administration. The clar-
ity of the subsequent links between specific social groups,
their problems, political support and planning policies
facilitated widespread participation in metropolitan
strategic planning.
The strategic planning approach which emerged from
this process did not aim to be comprehensive, but it did
aim to be comprehensible to the groups whose needs
formed its basis. It consequently exposed the way com-
prehensive planning obscures effective political priorities.
In contrast, the conventional wisdom in Britain sees the
planning system as one of "plan-making plus the control
of development." Because all proposed changes in the use
of land require specific planning permission, the plan-
making process is dominated by designing a set of criteria
against which specific planning applications will be
judged.
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The "development control dominated" planning process
generally has only very attenuated ideas about a desirable
future pattern of land uses; this is all that is practicable
where virtually all development is undertaken by the
private sector. The overall pattern of land uses emerges
from the application of these rules over a substantial
period of time. Moreover, the land use pattern is to some
extent unpredictable, depending on developers' decisions
about which sites to develop and how to develop them
most profitably. In the face of severe restrictions on public
expenditure, public infrastructure investment tends to be
dominated by private sector development decisions. In the
process, investment in community facilities "gets lost." As
a consequence, it is often argued that the main function
of this type of planning is to remove key aspects of uncer-
tainty from competition among developers.
The "development control dominated" approach to writ-
ing plans also leads to unfocused and ambiguous plan
documents, since the planners attempt to anticipate all
possible problems and considerations in the early stages
of plan development. Such comprehensive plans are in-
comprehensible to all but the professionally initiated. The
mystifying planning process then inhibits participation.
The City of London across the river Thames.
Planned Action "Now!"
The incoming Labour administration was committed
to coming up with speedy answers to the key problems.
The GLC was politically marginal. The fact that control
alternated between the Labour and Tory parties at vir-
tually every election clearly challenged the conventional
wisdom that metropolitan strategic planning should be
long-term in orientation. The GLC felt it was absurd to
wait 20 to 25 years for solutions to the urgent problems
of today, especially when they knew that the next elected
administration would reverse many of their key policies.
The commitment to planned action "now!" required de-
veloping strategic policies which could be implemented
immediately. The Community Areas Policy exemplified
this approach.
Direct Implementation
The GLC was committed to directly implementing its
own plan. Metropolitan government in London was a
"two tier" system. The GLC was responsible for providing
a strategic planning framework within which the 33 sec-
ond-tier boroughs could pursue locally adapted planning
policies, as long as they were consistent with the GLDP.
Boroughs thus held the main development control powers
and were also free to develop formal local plans. The local
government and planning system operated under the as-
sumption that the bulk of public sector investment, out-
side of major metropolitan roads investment, would be
undertaken by the boroughs. The GLC retained residual
development control powers, mainly over very large
developments and development affecting metropolitan
roads. It also maintained a large public sector home-
building program.
The division of responsibilities within the system was
fairly sensible in a period of expanding public sector
expenditure and relative political consensus over the use
of public sector investment. Nevertheless, strong political
divisions between inner and outer London always limited
access to land and housing to solve inner London prob-
lems. From the mid-1970s on, fiscal crises in the inner
London boroughs enhanced the importance of direct GLC
investment, but there was substantial disagreement over
whether to discourage speculative development in central
London. Some of the inner boroughs were desperate for
the increased property tax revenue generated by commer-
cial development.
Thus, the GLCs commitment to the Community Areas
Policy— interpreted as "no go" areas for commercial
development— was not merely contentious; it could not
be fully implemented without the cooperation of the bor-
oughs. The grants program was welcomed by the boroughs,
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because they could not afford to invest in community
facilities themselves. More importantly the grants raised
significant community opposition to commercial develop-
ment within these boroughs. Thus, the commitment to
direct implementation by the GLC challenged an un-
spoken assumption, written into the very structure of
London government, that the GLC would not become
directly politically involved in "local" or borough plan-
ning issues.
Commercial Development
The last administration at the GLC was primarily con-
cerned with the detrimental consequences of commercial
development on inner London communities. The conven-
tional wisdom of metropolitan strategic planning in the
sixties and seventies emphasized organizing a broad pat-
tern of land uses to facilitate private sector development
by designating areas for future development. Within this
context, the GLDP provided a framework for coordinating
public sector infrastructure investment with private sec-
tor development.
The revised GLDP proposed a tightly drawn Central
Activities Zone, within which commercial development
would be contained. This zone was surrounded entirely
by a Community Areas Ring, in which commercial de-
velopment was largely prohibited. The administration
accepted that this policy would increase land prices within
the Central Activities Zone, and lead to increased specu-
lative pressures around its boundary. Nevertheless, they
argued that strong and clear strategic policies would
facilitate control over these pressures. This strategic view
of the relationship between the land market and planning
policies underpinned more detailed policies throughout
the plan.
Legislative Barriers
The final challenge to the accepted planning practice
was of a different order. Revising the GLDP to meet the
GLCs political objectives exposed many of the detailed
ways that the institutional and legislative framework for
planning facilitates the interests of developers as a group,
while failing to provide protection for those who bear the
social costs of development. By the time the GLC was
abolished, work on a new legislative framework for plan-
ning was proposed and this concept gained momentum
up to the general election in 1987.
By attempting to meet four apparently simple demands
on metropolitan strategic planning, the GLC fundamen-
tally questioned the conventional wisdom written into the
legal and administrative framework for metropolitan
strategic planning.
Increasing land values prompted British Rail to sell these flats for rehabili-
tation and owner-occupation at prices far beyond the means of the local
population.
It is important to realize that these basic challenges to
the conventional wisdom would not have led to a radi-
cially different kind of plan and planning process if they
had not been closely linked with wider practical initiatives
enabling broader general political participation in London.
The next section examines the way this wider context
affected participation in the metropolitan strategic plan-
ning process.
Challenging Cynicism: participation in
metropolitan strategic planning
Organizing effective participation in metropolitan stra-
tegic planning is difficult at the best of times. During a
period of economic recession, it becomes an even more
challenging endeavor.
Three interrelated problems inhibit involvement by dis-
empowered groups. First, their knowledge of London
tends to be localized, reflecting spatially restricted access
to housing, jobs and transportation. Second, particularly
in a time of economic crisis, problems such as unemploy-
ment, inadequate housing, maintaining a household and
raising children are of more immediate concern than
commenting on issues about the long-range quality of life
throughout the metropolitan area. Finally, the generally
legalistic and bureaucratic ways of planning inhibit those
who are uncertain, inarticulate and those who have been
socialized to accept that they have no choice but to
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acquiesce to the vagaries and whims of those with power,
money or education.
Even at the best of times, participation at the metro-
politan level tends to mobilize groups with a clear metro-
politan-wide interest. In London, the roads lobby and
private developers have always been prominent. Economic
recession enhances their interest in planning as they try
to increase their access to scarce resources. With access
to resources to pursue their interests, these lobbyists can
easily obscure the interests of less powerful groups. In this
situation, planners are often left to defend the disem-
powered with very little political support and within an
administrative framework which enjoins them to be
"politically neutral."
SELL
elected members and the public The GLC's political
marginality further reinforced these processes, as plan-
ners avoided implementing policies which were politically
contentious in order to avoid undoing their own work
after the subsequent election.
Personal cynicism results from the placement of polit-
ical administration within a broader social structure. It
is not the result of the (in)competence or apathy of indi-
viduals, but rather the limits on what individuals can
achieve within the broader system. The final administra-
tion at the GLC expanded these limits by developing the
planning participation process within a general political
strategy which addressed social structural issues. This





Residents of Lambeth Borough protest office and hotel development and advocate housing.
This critique of planning participation is well known.
However, without considerable political and administra-
tive resources, individual planners are powerless to cor-
rect it. In practice, planners have responded to these
problems with a deep cynicism, reflecting an attempt to
maintain their democratic aspirations within an institu-
tional framework which frustrates their achievement.
Narrowly conceived "professional interests" often rein-
force this cynicism. Making planning a technical exercise
enhances the power of professional planners within polit-
ical administrative systems, usually to the detriment of
among planning officers for participation, and involved
previously excluded groups in the participation process.
As a result, the extensive direct contact between officers
and members of these groups mobilized officers' profes-
sional commitments to fair, just and democratic planning,
and helped them overcome much of their cynicism.
The lessons that one can learn from this experience can
usefully be analyzed in terms of the ways that narrow pro-
fessional interests interact with personal cynicism to
distort the participation process. The most direct way to
do this is to reformulate four questions that cynical plan-
ners often ask about participation.
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Willingness to Participate
The first question cynical planners ask is: "Are people
willing and able to participate?" The experience of the GLC
poses a far more disturbing question: "Is the local author-
ity willing and able to participate?"
Three aspects of the GLC's participation program sup-
port this reformulation. First, the program was based on
direct consultation with the specific social groups included
in the GLC's general political strategy. These groups were
in a position to respond positively and creatively because
they were supported by broader grants and policy pro-
grams. Second, groups were encouraged to talk about
their general concerns very early on in the planning pro-
cess and were not restricted to simply commenting on
"planning matters" as defined by planners. These general
discussions often originated in policy work outside of the
planning department and provided an important basis for
developing specific planning policies addressing broader
concerns. For example, the women's unit in the director
general's department identified a series of specific plan-
ning problems associated with setting up women's centers
as part of their general grants and policy work. Finally,
the speed of the planning process itself generated a
momentum which sustained interest in participation. In
these ways the general political strategy of the GLC sup-
ported a planning participation process which led to
innovative planning policies specifically addressing an
increased scope of issues and problems for a wide range
of disempowered groups.
Representation
Second, cynical planners ask: "Are local organizations
representative of the urban poor?" The experience of the
GLC's political commitment to specific social groups
exposes the fallacy in the way this question is posed and
suggests that it should be rephrased: "Is the local authority
representative of the urban poor?"
In general, the narrow pursuit of professional interests
within political administrative systems succeeds partly
because it neglects to analyze the mobilization of bias
within interlocking political, electoral, administrative and
technical processes. This silence reinforces cynicism about
participation, because it implicitly denies the existence of
alternatives.
The GLC deliberately sought to mobilize bias in favor
of disempowered groups. Paticipants in the metropolitan
strategic planning process clearly derived their credentials
and legitimacy from these broader political and demo-
cratic processes, not from the technical and professional
preoccupations — or even aspirations — of planners. With-
out this strong political commitment, very little would
have changed.
Organization
Third, cynical planners ask, "how should participation
be organized?" Usually they mean, "should we use ques-
tionnaires, postal surveys, public meetings or exhibitions?"
The experience at the GLC shows that the question must
be linked to political and social organization generally,
and the techniques used must support, and not under-
mine, broader social organization. Thus, the question can
be reformulated: "How does the participation process fit
into the wider social organization of the area?"
The GLC's participation exercise was based on clear
political answers to this question. As a result, the single
most effective, positive, and creative public meeting on
the GLDP revisions was the women's meeting. Two hun-
dred and fifty women packed a county hall conference
room, and spent an evening enthusiastically talking about
the variety of ways in which planning could help them.
The success of this meeting ensured that women's issues
were integrated throughout the revised GLDP. In contrast,
later meetings organized around specific land use topics
were desultory.
The GLC also developed a number of technical innova-
tions. Meetings were tape recorded and oral comments
were generally accepted as formal submissions. Copies of
drafts of the plan, with people's own marginal comments,
were also accepted. Small discussion groups were carefully
planned to ensure that articulate members of community
groups were present to encourage the less articulate to
criticize the successive drafts. Meetings were chaired by
people who were not part of the GLC, and politicians and
senior officers rarely spoke at these meetings. Platforms
were carefully balanced to demonstrate the GLC's com-
mitment to particular groups. Documents were under-
standable, and available in a variety of languages.
It is necessary to explicitly design participation methods
which provide details of the needs of specific social
groups. Failure to develop this sort of approach suggests
political failure, rather than the lack of appropriate
techniques.
Data
Fourth, cynical planners ask, "what data is needed for
planning and how is it to be collected?" The pursuit of
professional interests suggests that answering this ques-
tion is part of the planner's technical expertise. However,
rephrasing the question illustrates its relation to partici-
pation: "What demands are being expressed through
participation and what new data sources may be needed?"
Two examples from the Community Areas Policy show
why rephrasing the question in this way is important. The
first example relates to "creeping conversions"; that is,
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77ie Community-based Coin Street Group is developing 56 new houses and flats.
changes of land use without planning permission. Creep-
ing conversions can have substantial and irreversible
impacts on small areas over very short periods of time.
Planners usually rely on administrative records of per-
mit applications to determine trends in current demand
for particular land uses. Only after community groups
persistently pointed out creeping conversions did GLC
planners admit that land uses could change without plan-
ners' permission and begin to develop policies to tackle
the problem.
The second example comes from the Community Areas
grants program. After the first request for applications
produced a totally unexpected flood of responses, one of
the program administrators remarked, "I've been a plan-
ner for twenty years. I've always been told that it's part
of my professional expertise to know what the community
wants. Looking at these applications now, I know for the
first time in my career what the community wants." The
grants program enabled people to say in real and prac-
tical terms what they needed. Many of the groups who
applied for grants would never have participated in a
formal planning participation exercise, but their views
about what they needed were integrated into the metro-
politan strategic planning process from the beginning
through the grants program.
The GLCs planning participation exercise, because it
was set within the context of a general program of political
participation, brought to light how planners' cynicism
about participation is a consequence of power relation-
ships in broader social and political structures. More
importantly, it showed some of the ways that planning
participation exercises can contribute to or modify these
relationships.
Conclusion
The last GLC administration demonstrated not only
how metropolitan strategic planning and public participa-
tion can be closely linked, but also how each is further
linked to wider political and democratic processes. By
developing an "alternative practice" which explicitly ad-
dressed questions of powerlessness within the wider urban
society of London, the GLC exposed the ways in which
"conventional" planning practice obscures power rela-
tionships.
The lasting legacy of the last GLC administration is not
merely just that it provides a critique of "normal" or ac-
cepted planning practice. It also provides a way of think-
ing about planning practice which allows us to begin to
develop equally creative and positive approaches in other
political and social circumstances.
Many of the people associated with the last GLC ad-
ministration currently feel tired and disappointed. But
they do not feel that their efforts were wasted. To move
so close to a vision of fair, just and democratic planning,
to see what is involved in progressive social and political
change, and to begin to understand how local authority
planning can contribute to this change are inspiring. In-
deed, many of the lessons learned from this experience
have been adopted elsewhere in British planning. By giv-
ing an effective voice to disempowered social groups, the
GLC showed that the structure of power within a society
can be a matter of social choice.
Judith Allen teaches planning at the Polytechnic of Central London. She
was involved in planning at the GLC between 1981 and 1986. She is
a 1969 graduate of the Department of City and Regional Planning at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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Population—A Key Component of Planning
Education for Developing Countries
Linda Lacey
During the next 20 years, much of the developing world will undergo significant demographic changes, such as popula-
tion growth and urbanization. The effects of these changes can already be seen in many areas of Latin America, East
Asia and especially Africa. This article suggests how to redesign population studies to provide planners with a frame-
work for understanding the complex interrelationships between demographic factors and development. The commen-
tary which follows provides an example of how the author and her colleagues are implementing such a program at DCRP.
Most developing countries are undergoing major dem-
ographic transitions, characterized by rapid population
growth and massive urban-bound movements of popula-
tion. Estimations and projections developed by the United
Nations indicate that many of the poorest countries are
doubling in population every 20 years (United Nations,
1985). Accelerated population growth has led to high pro-
portions of the population under 15 years of age which,
in future years, will keep crude birth rates high in spite
of declining levels of fertility. This situation is most ap-
parent in sub-Saharan African countries and poor Asian
and Latin American countries, where 46 to 52 percent of
the population is under the age of 15 (United Nations,
1985).
The consequences of high levels of population growth
and rapid urbanization have been particularly harsh for
those countries at lower stages of development. At the
national level, rapid growth has a direct effect on the
quantity, quality, and distribution of educational facil-
ities and services and health care services, both preventa-
tive and curative. High rates of population growth have
also led to a greatly increased number of individuals enter-
ing the labor force. This increase forces governments to
absorb successively larger cohorts of young adults into
urban and rural economies (Birdsall, 1977). In poorer
countries, many of these young labor force entrants will
experience underemployment and unemployment rather
than productive lives. In rural areas of many countries,
population pressures on limited land have resulted in rural
out-migration, land fragmentation, overstocking and graz-
ing, soil erosion and, in general, declines in land produc-
tivity. In urban areas, high levels of natural increase
combined with rapid urban growth due to internal and
international migration have led to numerous problems
in cities: shortages of housing, water, sewage systems, elec-
tricity and social services; traffic congestion; and urban
underemployment and unemployment.
Projects and programs designed by planners at all
levels — community, rural, urban, regional and national —
are affected by the demographic changes that are taking
place. Population growth and rapid urbanization com-
bined with limited resources interfere with the ability of
planners to develop and implement social, physical and
economic programs. However, just as population growth
and rapid urbanization influence our ability to plan,
population variables such as size, distribution, growth
rate, age and sex composition, fertility, mortality, and
migration levels, are influenced by efforts to promote
social and economic development. Examples of such
development efforts include squatter settlement upgrading
programs in urban areas, improvements in agricultural
technology, and the expansion of educational, health care
facilities and other social services. Advances in transpor-
tation and communications systems, the promotion of
industrialization, and integrated rural development initi-
atives can alter demographic trends.
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The interrelationship between population and develop-
ment is highly complex. However, in the past two decades,
a wealth of literature has emerged that focuses on the
consequences of population growth, the determinants of
demographic change, population and development inter-
relationships and, in recent years, alternative ways to in-
tegrate population programs into development planning.
It is important for planners to understand the relation-
ships that exist among demographic factors — fertility,
mortality and migration — as well as the many relation-
ships that exist between population and development
variables. Knowledge of this nature would assist profes-
sionals in developing more realistic goals and objectives.
It would also raise awareness of the demographic conse-
quences of planning actions and aid the profession in
promoting the development and integration of popula-
tion policy intervention strategies into planning activities
at the national and subnational levels.
Few planning schools provide adequate training in the
field of population. Much of the educational training
related to population is limited to demographic estima-
tion and projection techniques that require reliable census
data and other secondary sources. However, as enroll-
ments of students from developing countries are increas-
ing in many programs across the country, many schools
have or are in the process of developing international con-
centrations within their programs. For planning schools
that focus on the needs of planners from developing coun-
tries, it is essential to redesign the teaching of population.
It is important to have courses that explore population
and development interrelationships, that assist students
in developing skills in population intervention policies
that include both fertility regulation measures and spatial
policies, and that provide skills in estimating and project-
ing population trends in countries where census data are
unavailable or unreliable.
The purpose of this article is to explore a two-course
sequence in population for students who are either from
developing countries or who are interested in pursuing a
career in planning in developing countries. The first
course, Population and Planning in Developing Countries,
investigates the various interrelationships that exist be-
tween population and planning. The second course,
Demographic Techniques, assists students evaluating the
quality of demographic and other population-related data
and developing skills in estimation and projection tech-
niques in situations where census data and vital registra-
tion systems are unavailable or unreliable. Most sociology
or biostatistics departments offer demographic techniques
courses that focus predominately on developing countries.
Given the limited faculty resources in most planning
departments, I suggest that students in developing coun-
West Point Community, a large squatter settlement of about 25,000 in
Monrovia, Liberia
tries concentrations take a demographic technique course
as their second population course outside of the planning
department.
It should be mentioned that, in most universities,
courses are also offered in social and economic demog-
raphy which expose students to population and develop-
ment issues. However, these courses are not tailored to
the needs of planning students, since much of the focus
is on national development. Planning students require ex-
posure to population-planning interactions at subnational
levels — rural, regional, urban and local community levels.
The article is presented in two sections. First, a brief
overview is provided on the demographic outlook for
developing countries with an emphasis on Africa, since
most African countries are experiencing declining econ-
omies, rapid population growth, and rapid urbanization.
Next, a description is provided on possible topics that
could be incorporated into a course on Population and
Planning. Ideally, the materials should be presented as an
entire course. However, it is hoped that planning educators
with limited resources will be able to choose possible




Of the regions of the developing world, Africa will
experience the greatest degree of demographic change
during the next 20 years. Medium variant estimates and
projections made by the United Nations indicate that from
1980 to the year 2000 Africa will increase in population
by 401 million or 81 percent, Latin America by 188 mil-
lion, or 51 percent; East Asia by 287 million, or 24
percent; and South Asia by 666 million, or 47 percent
(United Nations, 1985). High levels of population growth
in African countries are readily apparent in the table,
where medium variant estimates and projections are pro-
vided for select countries. The data clearly indicate that
most countries have high rates of annual growth and will
continue to double in population size every 20 years. In
Kenya, with the highest annual growth rate of 4.12 per-
cent, the average woman has eight children during her
reproductive years. Consequently, the nation's population
is expected to more than double by the end of the cen-
tury, rising from 7.9 million in 1960 to 16.7 million in 1980
and to a projected 38.5 million by the year 2000.
Percent of Urban Population and Levels
of Population Growth in Select African Countries
Urban Population (in Percentages)
2950 2960 1970 1980 2990 2000
World
Developed Regions 53.6 60.3 66.4 70.6 74.2 77.8
Africa 14.8 18.4 22.9 28.7 35.5 42.2
Latin America 41.1 49.3 57.4 65.3 71.9 76.6




Ghana 14.5 23.3 29.1 35.9 43.5 51.2
Kenya 5.6 7.4 10.2 14.2 19.5 26.2
Liberia 13.0 18.6 26.0 34.9 44.0 52.1
Namibia 15.4 23.3 33.5 45.2 57.0 66.0
Nigeria 10.5 13.1 16.4 20.4 26.1 33.4
Senegal 16.5 22.4 29.6 38.0 46.7 54.9
Swaziland 1.4 3.9 9.7 19.8 33.1 44.5
Tanzania 3.6 4.8 6.9 11.8 18.1 25.0




Countries 1980-85 2950 1960 2970 2980 1990 2000
Ghana 3.25 4,242 6,772 8,614 11,457 15,886 21,923
Kenya 4.12 5,822 7,903 11,290 16,766 25,413 38,534
Liberia 3.16 855 1,047 1,365 1,871 2,571 3,564
Namibia 2.78 665 820 1,042 1,349 1,787 2,382
Nigeria 3.34 32,935 42,305 57,221 80,555 113,343 161,930
Senegal 2.66 2,500 3,041 4,008 5,708 7,501 10,036
Swaziland 3.03 277 338 426 558 759 1,041
Tanzania 3.52 7,886 10,025 13,513 18,867 26,998 39,129
Zambia 3.31 2,440 3,141 4,189 5,648 7,912 11,237
(Source: The United Nations. 1985. United Nations World Population Prospects. Estimates and Projections as Assessed
in 1982. New York : United Nations.)
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High levels of population growth are a result of high
fertility rates, combined with the substantial reductions
in infant and child mortality due to advances in health
care, hygiene and nutrition and improved standards of
living. Estimates of crude birth rates for Africa as a region
show that rates have remained relatively constant during
the past 30 years (49.8 per 1,000 in 1950 to 48.8 in 1980),
while mortality rates have declined from 29.3 in 1950 to
17.7 per 1,000 in 1980 (World Bank, 1984).
Annual rates of growth have declined in many Latin
American countries and most Asian countries. However,
in absolute numbers these countries are still experiencing
growth. While fertility levels have been reduced, mortality
rates are also declining. Because of declines in mortality
rates and the young age structure of population in these
regions, we can expect fairly high levels of population
growth in absolute numbers to take place during the com-
ing decades (United Nations, 1985).
High levels of population growth are accompanied by
rapid urbanization. Urban growth is a consequence of
three factors: urban natural increase, migration and
reclassification of urban areas. According to the United
Nations, only 40 percent of urban growth is due to migra-
tion in developing countries (United Nations, 1982), while
natural increase accounts for about 58 percent. This asser-
tion is in debate in much of the migration literature; for
example, Todaro argues that most urban growth is a result
of migration. High levels of urban growth due to natural
increase are a result of high levels of fertility among
migrants, since many arrive in cities in their peak repro-
ductive years (Todaro, 1979).
Urban-bound movements of population are in part a
response to population pressures on limited resources.
These pressures are most intense in rural areas, where
population growth can exceed the productivity of the
land. Some rural out-migrants move to more productive
rural areas to seek employment and /or land for farming,
but many move to urban locales. While out-migration can
take place because of negative factors associated with the
place of origin, the decision to move can also be made
because of the attraction or pull of cities. Individuals and
families from both rural and urban places of origin are
attracted to urban locales for educational facilities, eco-
nomic opportunities, and/or for the amenities that rep-
resent modern life-styles.
Africa as a region will experience the highest level of
urban growth over the next two decades, in part because
the region has been the least urbanized in the past. The
spatial transformations that developing regions are experi-
encing can also be observed in the table. It should be
mentioned that the data are based on estimations and pro-
jections and provide a crude indication of urban growth,
since countries vary in their definition of urban. In 1950,
32.8 million Africans resided in urban centers. By 1980,
136.7 million lived in urban locales and by the year 2000,
we can expect close to 370 million to be urban dwellers
(United Nations, 1985). Countries in East and West Africa
that were the least urban in 1950 will experience the most
urban growth. In Liberia, for example, only 13 percent
of the population lived in urban centers in 1950, but if
present trends continue, that rate is expected to increase
to 52.1 percent by the year 2000. Similar patterns can be
observed for other countries such as Ghana, Namibia,
Senegal, Swaziland and Tanzania.
Proposed Course in Population and Planning
In order to develop effective plans and programs that
take into account high levels of population growth and
rapid urbanization, it is important to consider the recent
demographic trends. In this section, I present a number
of topics that could be incorporated into a course on Pop-
ulation and Planning in Developing Countries. Topics for
the course are listed below, followed by a brief descrip-
tion of some of the major components:
1. Demographic Concepts and Measurements
2. Population and Development Interrelationships
a. Transition Theories
b. Consequences of Population Growth
c. Determinants of Demographic Behavior
3. Population Policy Intervention Strategies
4. Population and Planning Policy Questions
1. Demographic Concepts and Measurements
To understand the demographic trends that are taking
place, it is important for students to know basic concepts
and measurements of the components of demographic
change: mortality, fertility, migration and nuptiality. In
the analysis of fertility, they should know and be able
to calculate crude birth rates, age-specific fertility rates,
the general fertility rate, total fertility rates, and gross
reproduction and net reproduction rates. They should also
be able to calculate simple rates and ratios to analyze
mortality, migration and nuptiality. Students should also
be exposed to general concepts of population change in-
volving the interaction of the components of demographic
change — the balancing equation, natural increase, annual
rates of growth, doubling time and stable population
models. It is also important for them to study the age-
sex structure and composition of populations using simple
techniques such as dependency ratios, sex ratios, aging
ratios, and population pyramids. These introductory
measures should be complemented in their second semes-
ter with a course in demographic techniques.
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2. Population and Development Interrelationships
Literature on the relationship between population and
development falls under three broad headings: (a) tran-
sition theories which focus on the process of demographic
change in the context of development, (b) consequences
of population growth and rapid urbanization as it relates
to development, and (c) literature on the determinants of
demographic behavior.
a. Demographic Transition Theories
Once students have been exposed to basic demographic
concepts and measurements, it is important to introduce
them to theories that explain the process of demographic
change as countries undergo stages of development. Three
"transition theories" have emerged that attempt to relate
demographic change to stages of cultural and socioeco-
nomic development. All three are based upon the historic
precedents of the developed world. Although these theories
have been heavily criticized, they do provide students with
a framework with which to understand the types of demo-
graphic characteristics that we can expect for countries
at different stages of development.
The most widely-known theory is the demographic
transition theory. It was first introduced by Notestein in
1945 and was more recently revised by Caldwell in his
efforts to explain fertility behavior in the African context
(Caldwell, 1978). The theory attempts to identify eco-
nomic, social, cultural and technological factors that influ-
ence fertility and mortality rates in societies that are
undergoing various stages of development.
In 1971, two additional theories were introduced that
focused on mortality reductions and spatial patterns of
mobility. Omran introduced the epidemiologic transition
theory to explain the process of mortality reduction. He
states that "the theory of epidemiologic transition focuses
on the complex change in patterns of health and disease
and on the interactions between these patterns and their
demographic, economic, and sociologic determinants and
consequences" (Omran, 1971). Reductions in mortality
rates have accounted for much of the increase in rapid
population growth. Factors that have led to mortality
decline are highly complex and vary for countries that
are at different stages of development.
Zelinsky, a geographer, introduced the mobility tran-
sition model to explain the types of spatial movements
that we can expect as countries undergo the process of
modernization. He states that, "There are definite, pat-
terned regularities in the growth of personal mobility
through space-time during recent history, and these reg-
ularities comprise an essential component of the moderni-
zation process" (Zelinsky, 1971, p. 121). He introduces
students to the types of spatial movements and vital
transitions — fertility and mortality— that take place as
societies move from "pre-modern" traditional societies to
advanced societies. All three theories assist students in
analyzing processes of demographic change in the con-
text of modernization and development.
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b. Consequences of Demographic Change
Much of the literature on the consequences of popula-
tion growth focuses on the negative impact of population
growth on the achievement of development objectives.
Readings on rapid urbanization tend to investigate both
PERU
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Source: Resources for Awareness of Populations, Impact on Develop-
ment, The Futures Group, Washington, D.C., 1981.
the positive and negative aspects of urban-bound move-
ments of population at the national and individual level.
It is important for students to be exposed to literature in
both of these areas. A classic book on population and
development, Population Growth and Economic Devel-
opment in Low Income Countries, was written by Coale
and Hoover in 1958, to introduce students to macro-level
consequences of rapid population growth. At The Univer-
sity of North Carolina, we use microcomputer models as
well as literature on the consequences of population
growth on development to examine Coale and Hoover's
hypotheses. The RAPID model, Resources for the Aware-
ness of Population Impacts on Development, explores the
impact of rapid population growth on meeting develop-
ment needs in a number of different sectors — agriculture,
health, education, urbanization and housing. Models are
available for over 20 countries at various levels of develop-
ment. Students can change assumptions in the model and
project future relationships to the year 2030. The models
and literature alert students to the interdependencies that
exist between population growth and development.
It is also of crucial importance that students be exposed
to the microconsequences of rapid population growth,
such as the detrimental effect of large families on mater-
nal and child health and on child development. This area
may be of particular interest to students who are interested
in social welfare programs for the poor. It would assist
them in understanding the interrelationships between
family size, birth spacing, morbidity, malnutrition, low
productivity, and poverty. Birdsall provides excellent sum-
maries and bibliographies for this literature in some of
her work (Birdsall, 1977; World Bank, 1984).
c Determinants of Demographic Behavior
Knowledge of the determinants of demographic change
assists students in understanding the factors that influence
fertility, mortality and migratory behavior. Reviews of
literature in this area provide insights on measures that
can be implemented to control and guide demographic
processes. More important, it provides a basis from which
qualitative assessments can be made of future demo-
graphic trends.
In the past two decades, a wealth of literature has
emerged on the determinants of fertility. The earlier
literature attempted to explore the direct relationship be-
tween fertility and a host of socioeconomic variables, such
as income, industrialization, urbanization, education,
health, the status of women, family structure, religion,
and ethnicity (Hardiman and Midgley, 1982). Different
studies established different associations, and few ex-
plained why odd relationships could be found. Many of
the earlier studies failed to realize that fertility is subject
to biological contraints and is influenced by demographic
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events as well as socioeconomic factors. For example,
increases in the age of marriage contribute significantly
to reductions in fertility. Davis and Blake, and, in recent
years, Bongaarts, have introduced more realistic models
to understand the interrelationship between fertility,
demographic events and socioeconomic factors (Davis and
Blake, 1956); Bongaarts et al., 1984). Much of the litera-
ture deals with the proximate determinats of fertility The
Bongaart model, in particular, shows that two classes of
determinants influence fertility behavior. (Proximate
determinants, consist of all biological and behavioral fac-
tors. These include as proportion of married women, fre-
quency of intercourse, postpartum abstinence, lactational
amenorrhea, contraception, induced abortion, natural
sterility and pathological sterility; and (b) socioeconomic
and environmental variables, such as social, cultural, eco-
nomic, institutional, psychological, health and environ-
mental considerations. In the model background,
variables influence fertility through the proximate deter-
minants, which directly affect fertility.
Socioeconomic Proximate Fertility
Environmental Variables Determinants
The proximate determinants of fertility literature
evolved to assist those involved in developing and imple-
menting population policies and/or family planning pro-
grams to understand the factors that influence reductions
in fertility. The literature is beneficial for planners in that
it provides a basis from which implications for future fer-
tility trends can be derived.
Another body of literature on the determinants of fertil-
ity focuses on the economic rationale of family size. This
literature consists of micro-level theories introduced by
Easterlin on the economics of having children (1969) and
writing in recent years by Caldwell on inter-generational
flows of wealth. It also considers macro-level studies that
investigate relationships between fertility and economic
development. While fertility is lowest in countries which
have attained high levels of economic development, some
poor countries, such as Costa Rica, Cuba and Sri Lanka,
are also experiencing significant reductions in fertility. It
is important for students to investigate both the micro-
and macro-level factors that lead to fertility reductions.
Of the components of demographic change, migration
is most strongly influenced by planning decisions and is
the factor that is most likely to lead to rapid growth at
the sub-national level. In the last two decades, a great deal
of literature has been written on migrant selectivity, fac-
tors that influence the decision to move, and spatial
patterns of movement. Empirical studies and theoretical
models have been developed by scholars in economics,
sociology, geography, demography, cultural anthropology,
and regional planning. Most of the studies focus on the
individual or household unit. Literature on the migration
decision-making process include Lee's theory of migration
(1966), Todaro's economic models of employment (1968)
and Dejong's reader on migration decision-making (1981).
There is also a wealth of literature on migrant selectivity
in books and key demography journals, such as Inter-
national Migration Review, Demography, and Population
and Development Review. Caldwell's book, African Rural-
Urban Migration, is a classic introduction to migrant dif-
ferentials in the African context (1968). Orlansky and
Dubrovsky's work, The Effects of Rural-Urban Migration
on Women's Role and Status in Latin America, provides
a comprehensive overview on female migration pattern
differentials (1978). These sources assist students in
understanding who moves and why. More importantly,
it alerts students to the impact of sub-national planning
activities on spatial mobility.
3. Population Policies
Population policies are explicit statements by national
governments stating their intentions to establish demo-
graphic goals and objectives that will affect fertility,
migration, and mortality. Measures to regulate fertility
include: (a) the provision of family planning services
either through clinics, outreach programs and/or through
social marketing activities; (b) the dissemination of pop-
ulation, family life, and sex education information; (c)
programs and policies to improve the status of women;
(d) the provision of incentives and disincentives to en-
courage families to regulate family size and (e) the intro-
duction of legal reforms.
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Most measures to alter mortality focus on improving
the quality of health and nutrition of the population.
There are a variety of strategies to alter migration pat-
terns: rural development programs can include a full range
of activities to improve living conditions and economic
activities in rural areas; dispersed urbanization strategies
can include the development of new major cities or growth
centers, the development of secondary or regional cities
and /or the development of rural service centers or market
towns; restrictive policies to control individual movements
to cities; and land colonialization schemes.
In most Asian countries and in some Latin American
countries, governments have implemented population pol-
icies to control rapid population growth. Increasingly,
African countries are also becoming aware of the need
to control population growth and maldistributions of pop-
ulation. Countries such as Cameroon, Liberia, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Senegal and Sierra Leone are actively pursuing
population policies in order to achieve national develop-
ment objectives and to improve the health of children and
mothers. Among the other sub-Saharan African countries
devising development plans which discuss the problems
created by rapid population growth and/or state the need
for family planning services are Botswana, Gambia,
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Uganda and the Zam-
bia (Isaacs, 1984).
Most of these countries recognize population policies
as integral parts of efforts to promote social and economic
well-being. This awareness was stated in the World Pop-
ulation Plan of Action during the first World Population
Conference in Bucharest in 1974 and reaffirmed at the
1984 International Conference on Population in Mexico
City, where 147 governments expressed their support for
the establishment and implementation of policies to alter
current demographic trends.
Effective policy implementation requires the integration
of intervention strategies and programs into a number of
socioeconomic development activities at all levels of
governments and in most fields of planning. Since most
population policies are implemented through ministries
of planning, it is important for students to review the
evolution of population policies and study the issues and
problems of effective implementation. Planners who ob-
tain positions in national or state-level planning agencies
are assisting population policy implementation efforts by
coordinating activities among different ministries, by
ensuring that socioeconomic plans promote aspects of
population programs and by controlling factors that have
negative demographic effects.
4. Population and Planning Policy Questions
Much of the literature on population and development
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issues focuses on these relationships at the national level.
In the last section of the course, students, through in-
dividual research projects, should attempt to investigate
various population-planning relationships at the sub-
national region as it relates to a variety of planning issues:
rural development, regional planning, housing, social ser-
vices planning, transportation planning, and urban plan-
ning. In examining each of the areas, it is important to
discuss the following questions:
a. How do present and future population growth and
distribution influence planning activities?
b. How do planning decisions alter demographic vari-
ables? What are the long-term impacts of planning
activities on demographic trends?
c. How should planners redesign strategies to promote
socioeconomic change, given existing and future
demographic trends?
The answers to these questions will vary since countries
are at different levels of development. The questions do,
however, provide a framework for developing innovative
planning solutions that take into consideration bleak
demographic trends.
Conclusion
Planners cannot alter the present demographic trends
in the near future. At best, we can attempt to understand
the processes and alter goals, objectives, plans and pro-
grams to take into account rapid population growth and
rapid urbanization. Planners can assist in controlling and
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guiding long-term demographic trends by becoming in-
volved in population policies, both fertility regulation
programs and spatial strategies.
I have introduced a number of topics and subtopics that
can assist planning students in understanding population
and development interrelationships. Knowledge in these
areas will improve our ability to plan effectively in de-
veloping countries. It is hoped that planning educators
will find the topics useful and will integrate components
into existing courses or will design new courses that ad-
dress population and planning issues. CI
Linda Lacey teaches in the new concentration, Planning in Developing
Areas, in the Department of City and Regional Planning at the Univer-
sity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She is currently involved in two
USAID projects that help developing countries formulate and imple-
ment population policies.
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Commentary
Meeting the Needs of Developing Countries:
Introducing a New Program of Study
Linda Lacey
Each day, planners in developing countries face a number of interrelated complex problems. In low-income countries
in particular, major cities are doubling in population every ten to fifteen years. As a result of uncontrolled urban growth,
planners are confronted with high levels of unemployment, major traffic congestion within the urban core, massive
housing shortages, and inadequate public services such as safe water, sewage systems, roads and electricity. Urban-
based problems are closely linked to high levels of rural unemployment and uneven regional development. The in-
terdependent nature of problems facing developing countries requires integrated regional, rural and urban planning
strategies.
To assist planners in developing countries and individuals working in international assistance agencies develop ap-
propriate solutions to development problems, the Department of City and Regional Planning at Chapel Hill has in-
troduced a new concentration: Planning in Developing Areas. Policy areas that receive special emphasis include: (1)
housing, (2) urban finance, (3) urban infrastructure and services, (4) environmental and resource management, (5) popula-
tion and development planning and (6) regional development planning.
Housing problems are severe in low-income countries in which an estimated 40 to 90 percent of city residents reside
in substandard housing, with limited access to water and sewage facilities. In countries where the majority of the urban
population is poor, planners need to acquire skills in order to design and administer low-cost housing strategies which
can provide better shelter for the urban poor. In the Department of City and Regional Planning (DCRP), students
examine the evolution of housing strategies in developing countries. They study the failures of approaches, such as
public housing projects used in the 1960s and 1970s, to meet the needs of large numbers of urban poor. They examine
the problems of implementing more recent approaches, including site and service schemes and core unit housing programs.
Urban finance is of critical concern to planners, since national governments have limited resources for urban develop-
ment. Our program exposes students to alternative strategies of managing and financing urban development projects
through case studies in successful countries.
As mentioned above, urban-based problems are related to complex rural and regional development issues. In our
program, students study interrelated causes of development problems such as rapid population growth, environment
degradation, the breakdown of traditional and cultural values and norms, and political and economic instability. To
understand the causes and consequences of development problems, students are exposed to theories in economics, spatial
geography, sociology, history and cultural anthropology. Students gain technical planning skills in a number of areas
to develop short- and long-term solutions to rural and regional problems. These skills are applied to problems in the
areas of community development, regional planning, cost-benefit analysis, project appraisal, negotiation and popula-
tion planning.
Faculty involved in the new concentration have a wealth of experience working directly with national ministries of
planning, health and local government, national housing authorities and donor agencies such as the United Nations,
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the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development. Dale Whittington has worked on water
resources policy and planning projects for the governments of Egypt, Haiti, Nigeria and Tanzania. He has also served
as a technical adviser to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Government of the Sudan, on the use of
microcomputers for development planning, budgeting and management. Dana Weist has recently been involved in a
comprehensive review of the income tax structure and the development of a fiscal planning model for Jamaica. Linda
Lacey has been involved in development projects in the areas of rural development, population planning and housing.
She has worked on projects for the governments of Botswana, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Liberia. She is cur-
rently assisting the governments of Botswana, Liberia and Nigeria in integrating population policies into health and
national development plans.
To complement the skills and experience of DCRP faculty, senior policy analysts from the Research Triangle Institute
are teaching courses in the new concentration. Founded in 1963, the Research Triangle Institute has over 50 senior staff,
who have worked on a broad range of development issues in over 50 countries. Current projects focus on municipal
finance management, integrated population and development planning, women in development, and water resources
management. In the Spring of 1988, Dr. Rondinelli, a scholar in decentralization policies and regional development
issues, will offer a course on regional development, Dr. McCullough, a DCRP alumnus and scholar in municipal finance,
will co-teach a course with Weist on municipal finance in developing countries.
A number of programs and departments on campus offer courses and research experiences valuable to students in-
terested in developing countries. Research centers include the Institute of Latin American Studies which coordinates
courses, guest speakers and research related to Latin American countries, the Water Resources Research Institute, the
Institute for Environmental Studies, the Center for Urban and Regional Studies, and the Carolina Population Center.
Departments and programs that offer courses relevant to this concentration include the Public Administration pro-
gram, the School of Public Health, and the departments of Sociology, Economics, Political Science and Geography.
Through the introduction of this new concentration, the Department of City and Regional Planning looks forward
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